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INTRODUCTION
Tax law consistently has been an area of major political inter-
est. Since 1969, or 1976 at the latest, it has become the subject of
an ongoing mass struggle in the United States, reaching far beyond
politicians and the inner circle of dedicated political spectators.
The struggle intensified in the 1980s and promises to stay in the
forefront of the political and popular mind. Three reasons for tax
law's continued popularity as a political issue come to mind.
First, there has been a significant increase in the number of
financially sophisticated people. The shift from factory worker to
office worker has accelerated our move into the information age.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law; J.D. 1981, Uni-
versity of Michigan; LL.M. (Taxation) 1986, New York University. I am indebted to my
colleagues Michael Chellis and Mary Lou Fellows for substantive and editorial comments
which greatly improved this piece.
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Financial sophistication of taxpayers increased the use of and pres-
sure on the loopholes and preferences that had long been built into
the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") for use by a relatively
small group of sophisticated, high income taxpayers.
Second, when the middle classes joined the tax preference
game by the millions, and tax shelters began to be mass-marketed
professionally, anti-abuse provisions in the Code grew explosively.
Much of the tax legislation since 1969 has consisted of anti-abuse
provisions. As used here, and in most discussions of tax legislation,
an "anti-abuse provision" is a euphemism for a rule designed to
keep the middle classes from obtaining a tax benefit that was in-
tended for the rich.
The third reason for the recent mass struggle over United
States tax laws is that Congress and its penumbral ring of lobby-
ists have turned with increasing frequency to tax law as a means of
bestowing benefits on favored groups. Concern with federal budget
deficits, which has been growing steadily since the late sixties, in-
creased the attractiveness of using "expenditures" hidden in tax
law rather than direct spending programs. Also, Congress has be-
come increasingly more interested in manipulating our economy,
and tax law is an attractive tool for that purpose.
The foregoing events and factors have produced a Code that is
out of control, which further intensifies the mass struggle over our
tax law. The time is ripe for a retrospective look at authors who
wrote about basic tax issues. Although we cannot be sure what
message these works conveyed to readers in their own time, in the
midst of today's struggle they communicate the importance of get-
ting back to the basics. They help us focus on the importance of
theoretically sound, yet administrable definitions of gross income
and taxable income. They emphasize that the rate structure should
reflect reasoned thinking and conscious ethical judgments about
inequality, rather than mindless manipulation to fulfill campaign
promises or to revenue neutrality agreements.
This Article will not examine actual tax legislation, but only
the ideas and reasoning of scholarly commentators. The earliest
piece addressed was published in 1914.' The period under study
ends with the adoption of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
' Works on United States tax policy were published prior to 1914, but those discovered
were not sufficiently significant to warrant coverage here. See E.R.A. SELIGMAN, Tn INCOME
TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND
ABROAD v (2d ed. 1914) [hereinafter E.R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX].
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which began a new era with respect to tax legislation and tax
policy.2
Finally, this Article will address the ideas and reasoning of the
historical authors with respect to two issues: the proper definition
of income, and the use of personal exemptions and progressive
rates.3 The purpose of this Article is not simple historical report-
ing; rather, it is hoped that writers of the past can help us better
understand the problems of the future.
I. THE DEFINITION OF INCOME
When the decision was made to include an income tax in the
total tax system, a thoughtful definition of income was the next
appropriate step. Unfortunately, United States income tax history
did not begin this way. The nation's first income tax, in force from
1862 to 1871, was adopted as a temporary measure to finance the
Civil War.4 In 1894, Congress again adopted an income tax which
the Supreme Court promptly declared unconstitutional.5 Thereaf-
ter, the sixteenth amendment to the United States Constitution,
granting Congress the power to levy an income tax, was ratified in
1913. Despite the experience gained from the 1862 and 1894 in-
come tax laws, the first constitutional income tax act did not ad-
dress the definition of income as one of its fundamental compo-
nents. Complaining about this inadequacy in 1936, one scholar
noted that the 1913 Tax Act left the definition of income in a state
of confusion:
2 Although it made no changes in the substantive law, the Internal Revenue Code of
1939 was enacted in an effort to clarify the existing laws:
The 1939 [Code] effort was largely a matter of sorting and putting together cur-
rently operative internal revenue statutes-codification. Even so, the result was
the tax practitioner's "bible," the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Wholesale revi-
sion of the internal revenue laws was first accomplished in 1954, yielding a new
(King James Version?) "bible" for the practitioner.
J. FREELAND, S. LiND & R. STEPHENS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL
INcOME TAXATION 9 (6th ed. 1987) (emphasis in original).
2 Two other issues of fundamental importance, then and now, are the best type of tax
system (e.g., income, consumption, corporate, inheritance, and property taxes) and proper
tax treatment of capital and income from capital.
An income tax was adopted for the year 1861, but was never implemented. Act of
Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, §§ 49-51, 12 Stat. 292, 309-11 (1861). The 1862 tax, which officially
repealed and replaced the 1861 tax, was established by the Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, §§
81-83, 86, 89-93, 12 Stat. 432, 469-75 (1862).
' The 1894 Income Tax Act, Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, §§ 27-36, 28 Stat. 509, 553-60
(1894), was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429. 448-49 (1895).
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Viewed from the vantage point of the present, the federal income
tax law of 1913 seems an incredibly ndive document. Today it
seems astonishing that so many fundamental issues should have
been so slightly considered or so blithely ignored. The law con-
tained no precise and comprehensive description of the tax base.6
Because it was not adequately addressed by Congress, the pro-
cess of building and shaping a definition of income was left largely
to the Treasury Department and the federal courts. The judiciary
is, however, distinctly ill-suited for such a role. The nature of the
judicial process requires judges to address an issue piecemeal and
under constraint of the particular facts of each case. The Treasury
Department, although the best qualified to develop a useful,
thoughtful definition of income, was, unfortunately, the least pow-
erful of the participating entities.
Tax policy scholars have addressed the definition of income
with voluminous results, but it is not clear that their suggestions
have been heeded to any great extent. Some even have had the
good sense to develop their own versions of the best theoretical
definition of income, and then to discuss concessions to adminis-
trative and practical realities which reasonably might be made
without unduly compromising the theoretical starting point
Some scholars in tax policy might consider Professor Irving
Fisher's 1906 classic, The Nature of Capital and Income, as the
logical starting point in this discussion. 7 It is an early piece, yet
more sophisticated than many of its contemporaries. Fisher at-
tempted to convince his readers that income should be defined as
consumption. He was, in fact, an early and able proponent of a
consumption tax, which more commonly was referred to as a
spending tax in his day. Rather than arguing directly for the adop-
tion of a consumption tax, however, he insisted that the definition
of income be revised to exclude all savings and investments.
A. Robert M. Haig: Economic and Legal Aspects
In developing a portrait of "income," Robert Murray Haig be-
gan by painting a face that only an economist could loves by pro-
e Haig, Foreword to R. MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME at iii (1936).
See H. GROVES, TAX PHILOSOPHERS: Two HUNDRED YEARS OF THOUGHT IN GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 108 (1974) (net income should be defined to exclude
savings).
8 THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (R. Haig ed. 1921). In 1921, Robert Murray Haig (1887-
1953) was an associate professor at the Columbia University School of Business, having
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viding us with an extremely theoretical conceptualization of the
term: "Modern economic analysis recognizes that fundamentally
income is a flow of satisfactions, of intangible psychological exper-
iences."9 If a person earns a dollar and spends it to buy dinner, he
claims, income is neither the dollar nor the dinner. Income is the
satisfaction obtained from eating the dinner.
Therefore, two workers, each of whom earns a dollar and
spends it on an identical dinner, will have differing incomes if one
enjoys the meal more than the other. Nevertheless, Haig cited the
economists of his time who took the same position. For example,
Harvard's Professor Frank Taussig wrote: "Now just as all produc-
tion in the last analysis consists in the creation of utilities, so all
income consists in the utilities or satisfactions created. . . . Our
food, clothing, furniture, may be said to yield psychic income.
They shed utilities, so to speak, as long as they last."10 Professor
E.R.A. Seligman, of Columbia University, whose other work is dis-
cussed below,11 stated: "We desire things at bottom because of
their utility. They can impart this utility only in the shape of a
succession of pleasurable sensations. These sensations are our true
income." 2 Haig, however, admitted that:
the economist, while recognizing all this, realizes that before he
can proceed far with his analysis of economic phenomena he must
arrive at something more definite and more homogeneous-less
diaphanous and elusive than these psychic satisfactions.... How
impossible it is to compare one man's satisfaction with a book
with another man's satisfaction with his dinner!13
Haig's reaction appears schizophrenic. He first bemoaned the
fact that moving away from "psychic satisfactions" compromises a
valid and valuable theory.1 4 Then, in the same discussion, he
joined that faculty in 1912. During his career, Haig served on numerous commissions in
several countries, studying primarily the tax and public finance problems of cities and
states. See 45 THE NATIONAL CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 265-66 (1962).
Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX 2 (R. Haig ed. 1921).
Id. (quoting 1 F.W. TAuSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 134 (1916)).
' See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
12 Haig, supra note 9, at 3 (quoting E.R.A. SELIGMAN, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 16
(1914)).
12 Id. at 3-4.
4 Id. at 4-5.
It should be carefully noted, however, that, first, when one abandons
"usances" and satisfactions and substitutes the goods and services yielding these
satisfactions, he is taking a step away from the fundamentals.... For example,
1990]
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adopted the other side of the argument. "But is there, after all,
any theoretical injustice? Who, for instance, would seriously de-
fend the proposition that taxes should be apportioned according to
capacity for appreciation rather than according to the capacity to
command the goods and services which are appreciated?" 15 Haig
then switched from an income tax to a consumption tax analysis.
In the words of Professor Ely: Money income should, per-
haps, refer to the value of the goods consumed and the services
enjoyed, although in popular speech and by many economists the
word is used in the literal sense of the net amount of money that
comes in, whether it is spent for enjoyable things or is saved."6
To a modern reader, this highlights another weakness of the
satisfaction definition of income with which Haig began. If true in-
come is satisfaction, rather than money (or money's worth) used to
attain satisfaction, then money earned and saved is not income,
and we transform an income tax into a consumption tax without
ever admitting the fundamental change. The only reconciliation of
this analysis with an income tax is to hold that the act of saving
produces satisfaction that fits within Professor Haig's concept of
"true income." He mentioned this idea briefly and dismissed it as
"impracticable.'1 7
Haig simply seemed to be struggling with the inevitable, illogi-
cal ramifications of the assertion that satisfaction is the fundamen-
tal measure of income. His commentary exemplifies the struggles
of many tax scholars of his era with their insensitivity to the im-
portance of the time value of money.' For example, Haig asserted
that "[n]o great harm is done if the person who postpones spend-
ing his money is taxed upon it when he receives it rather than
when he spends it."'" An inability to discern the time value issues
frequently has lead to erroneous theories and conclusions in tax
policy.20
two persons who receive precisely equal amounts of goods and services may derive
therefrom very unequal "usances" and satisfactions.
Id.
Id. at 5.
18 Id. at 5 (quoting R. ELY, OUTLINES OF ECONOMICS 98 (1908)).
17 See id. at 6.
See, e.g., infra note 20 and accompanying text.
19 Haig, supra note 9, at 5.
2o For an enlightening exposure to the theory and practice of time value issues, respec-
tively, see Cunningham and Schenk, How to Tax the House That Jack Built, 43 TAX L.
REV. 447 (1988); Lokken, The Time Value of Money Rules, 42 TAx L. REV. 1 (1986).
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The trek from satisfactions, to goods and services, to money
left Haig with a final concern. If money was adopted literally and
strictly as the form of income measurement, all of the numerous
sources of in-kind benefits would be missed in the ultimate calcula-
tion of income. Haig explained:
The economics of this situation is very clear .... [G]oods and
services which are of significance are those which are susceptible
of evaluation in terms of money. It is not necessary that they
should actually have passed through the process of a sale. From
the point of view of equity it is theoretically important that all
goods and services received without payment should be accounted
for in case it is possible to value them in terms of money.21
Professor Haig considered these issues because he sought a ra-
tional route from his theoretical starting point to a definition of
income that could be of practical use with income tax problems.
Despite the weakness of his starting point and the resulting diffi-
culties that arise along the way, his trip, nonetheless, ended suc-
cessfully. Under his analysis,
income becomes the increase or accretion in one's power to satisfy
his wants in a given period in so far as that power consists of (a)
money itself, or, (b) anything susceptible of valuation in terms of
money. More simply stated, the definition of income which the
economist offers is this: Income is the money value of the net
accretion to one's economic power between two points of time.22
Haig contrasted the satisfaction definition and his ultimate ac-
cretion definition of income. Accretion "defines income in terms of
the power to satisfy economic wants rather than in terms of the
satisfactions themselves. It has the effect of taxing the recipient of
income when he receives the power to attain satisfactions rather
than when he elects to exercise that power."2
However, the observation failed to identify the significance of
the difference between a consumption tax (which results naturally
from an attempt to apply the satisfaction theory directly) and an
income tax (which results from application of his accretion defini-
tion of income). After identifying the difference between tax sys-
tems resulting from the two income definitions, Haig minimized it:
"This should do no violence to our sense of equity, however. The
21 Haig, supra note 9, at 6 (footnote omitted).
22 Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).
23 Id.
1990]
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fact that a man chooses to postpone the gratification of his desires
is no sufficient reason for postponing his tax. ' 24 This language sug-
gests that his choice between these two tax systems was not a fully
informed one. Modern economic analysis demonstrates that a tax
imposed when income is earned produces a substantially greater
burden than does a tax imposed at the time of consumption.25
Haig's accretion definition of income led him to some interest-
ing observations and conclusions. He maintained that an increase
in the value of an asset should be considered income, so long as the
increase "is sufficient in amount and definite enough in character
to be susceptible of precise evaluation in terms of money. '2 This
conclusion did not lead to the proposition that appreciation be
measured and taxed annually; Haig realistically conceded that "the
scientific economist in advising the legislator would be the last to
suggest an attempt to follow the implications of his analysis with-
out regard to the limitations imposed by the actual conditions
under which the law must function. ' 2 He adamantly asserted,
however, that administrative concessions should be identified as
such, and not defended on the erroneous ground that asset appre-
ciation is not income. Similarly, with respect to imputed income
from the rental value of an owner-occupied home, the rental value
is within his accretion definition of income, but the legislature rea-
sonably might decide not to tax it due to "special circumstances"
involved in the receipt of income in this manner.2"
Haig's use of the phrase "economic power" in his definition is
helpful because it focuses attention on the issue of inflation in de-
fining and measuring income:
If it were possible to modify the concept of taxable income so as
to eliminate [the effects of inflation] it would certainly be desira-
ble to do so.... [A]n approximate solution might be realized if
we were able to evolve a satisfactory index of the level of prices. If
24 Id.
2' For a further discussion and mathematical illustration of the difference between a
consumption tax and an income tax, see McCombs, Tax Incentives for Investment: A Free
Market Future Versus Our Pork Barrel Past, 64 IND. L.J. 665, 676-77 & n.47 (1989) (exam-
ple shows if investment deducted initially and investment income not taxed as earned it is
equivalent to zero tax rate on income from investment).
2 Haig, supra note 9, at 14.
27 Id.
28 With respect to imputed income from home ownership, we are told that Wisconsin
attempted to tax such income for several years, but eventually abandoned the matter. Id. at
14-15.
[Vol. 64:471
U.S. TAX POLICY SCHOLARSHIP
if were accurately known what the change in price level in a given
year had been, it might be possible to qualify [the measured in-
come] in such a way as to eliminate the influence of the changing
standard.29
One of Haig's last comments deals with the proper treatment
of gifts, an issue that plagues definitional attempts of most tax pol-
icy writers. Although Haig admitted that under his definition a gift
should be included in the donee's income, he rejected that result.
Instead he takes the common position that most gifts are given
within the family, and the family is, for many tax purposes, treated
as a single economic unit. Although most noncharitable gifts prob-
ably do occur within the family, they often involve a grandparent
donor and grandchild donee. The family unit recognized for tax
purposes, however, includes parents and dependent children only.
Thus, Haig's reasoning, which has some validity for gifts from par-
ents to dependent children, does not go as far as he implies, and
leaves grandparent-grandchild gifts and gifts from parent to an
adult child unresolved. Haig's income definition is similar to the
one developed by Henry Simons, whose work is discussed below.30
Although their conceptions have come to be known jointly as the
Haig-Simons definition of income, these two scholars were not har-
monious in their conclusions as to gifts. Before Simons' work on
this topic is analyzed, however, an intervening scholar must be
considered.
B. William W. Hewett: Income as Satisfaction and the Equity
Principles
In 1925, four years after Haig's definition was published, Wil-
liam Wallace Hewett wrote on the definition of income.3 1 Professor
Hewett began with a quote from Irving Fisher describing two crite-
ria of a good definition. "It must be useful for scientific analysis;
and it must harmonize with popular and instinctive usage. ' '3 2 The
2 Id. at 17. Perhaps recent experimentation by the accounting profession with financial
statements that address the effects of inflation will lead to the solution of the accounting
problem, thereby allowing tax law refinements needed to eliminate the influence of inflation
on income taxation.
30 See infra note 45.
"1 Dr. Hewett was then an assistant professor of economics at the University of Penn-
sylvania, having received his Ph.D. there in 1924. He moved to the University of Cincinnati
in 1929, and spent the rest of his career there. See 4 WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA 435 (1968).
32 W. HEWETr, THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AND ITs APPLICATION IN FEDERAL TAXATION
10 (1925) (quoting I. FISHER, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME 103 (1906)).
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choice of this quote is ironic because Fisher's definition of income
excludes all earnings saved or invested, and, therefore, is at odds
with the popular meaning of income and almost identical to the
popular meaning of consumption.
While Haig began his analysis with the abstract theory of sat-
isfaction, traveled "downstream" through goods and services, and
concluded with the concept of money's worth, Hewett began at the
opposite end, adopting money income as a starting point, yet per-
ceiving real income as consisting of "those commodities and ser-
vices that will satisfy the wants of men.""3 Hewett thus recognized
that many commodities and services are obtained without a money
transaction.
He then considered a final step, one that would place him at
Haig's point of beginning: "Many economists, while agreeing that
in practice the best definition of income is one in terms of com-
modities and services ... feel that in the 'final analysis' the utili-
ties or satisfactions of wealth and human beings are the true in-
come. '"" Hewett refused to take this step, in part because it would
violate Irving Fisher's criterion that a good definition remain in
touch with the popular meaning of the word. Most importantly,
Hewett perceived that a satisfaction definition of income would
lead to a consumption tax, while a commodity and service defini-
tion of income could lead to an income tax.3 5
A close cousin to the satisfaction definition of income is the
proposal that income consists of services received. This refers not
only to services rendered by other people, but includes "services"
rendered to the taxpayer by the physical objects he uses. The ser-
vice provided by a car, for example, is transportation; the service
provided by a home is shelter. Income can be defined to consist of
all services received from people and things. This approach is con-
ceptually related to the satisfaction definition because both lead to
a consumption tax. Under this approach, money received and
saved does not provide service to the recipient and, therefore,
should not be included in income. The service definition is a prac-
tical improvement over the satisfaction definition, because it is
based on money value of services received, thereby adopting a
quantifiable standard which does not vary from one person to the
" Id. at 11.
" Id. at 13.
" See id. at 14.
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next. Nevertheless, the service definition of income, like the satis-
faction definition, was rejected by Hewett because it was too far
removed from the common meaning of income, and because it in-
evitably would lead to a consumption tax. If we want a consump-
tion tax, he declared, we should argue for it directly rather than
trying to achieve it under the camouflage of a revisionist definition
of income.
Professor Hewett also discussed the economist's concept of so-
cial income (also called national income) and related it to individ-
ual income. "All individual incomes are obtained from the social
income, and the social income must therefore equal the total of all
individual incomes. '3'6 The benefit to be achieved from establishing
this equality is not clear. In fact, the correctness of the alleged
equality is not clear. Hewett admitted two exceptions to his rule:
first, gifts pose definitional difficulties because although they "di-
vert a flow of commodities and services to the [recipient] ... [they]
add[] nothing to the social income, and we are faced with an exam-
ple of a form of individual income which apparently is not social
income; the equality principle appears to break down. '37
Hewett's attempt to rescue the equality principle, however, is
unconvincing:
The solution to the problem rests in the fact that what really
happened was a transfer of title to incbme-an alteration in the
direction of the income flow. The father gave up a right to receive
real income, equal to the gain acquired by the son. There has
been no product or service added to the "national heap [of goods
and services]"; the receipt of the gift is offset by the surrender of
income by the giver. The equality of the social income with the
total of individual incomes is therefore maintained.3 8
One inevitable ramification of the foregoing explanation is that
money earned and given away, as a definitional matter, is not in-
come to the person who has earned it. Although Hewett rejected a
definitional exclusion for money that was earned and saved, he
failed to object to a definitional exclusion for money that is earned
and given away. Hewett's explanation would lead to the conclusion
that a donor should receive a tax deduction for gifts given, and
that such deduction could be disallowed only for policy or adminis-
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trative reasons, not for definitional reasons.39
Hewett also identified three categories of capital gain: (1) in-
creases in value of stock due to retained earnings of the corpora-
tion; (2) increases in prices of specific properties as a result of
changes in supply of or demand for those items; and (3) increases
in prices of all or most properties due to inflation. Because re-
tained earnings reflect real production of a corporation, Hewett
concluded that the corporation's stock experiences an increase in
real value and the shareholders derive income from it. Adhering to
his principle of equality between social income and aggregate indi-
vidual incomes, Hewett noted that equality is maintained by his
conclusion because the corporate production adds to social income
in the same amount that corporate earnings add to shareholder
income.
In Hewett's second category, an increase in value of a particu-
lar property due to scarcity (increased demand or decreased sup-
ply) produces real income to the owner. Economic power (com-
mand over goods and services) is increased. Here, as with gifts,
individual income is not paired with a corresponding increase in
social income. The individual's benefit does not reflect increased
production of goods or services. Hewett incorporated this excep-
tion into his equality principle, without attempting to rationalize
it.
With gains.derived from inflation, Hewett completed the triad
of possible combinations of social and individual income. Contrary
to his first two categories, neither individual nor social income is
present with inflation gains. There is no social income because pro-
duction of goods or services is unchanged. There is no individual
income because the property owner's economic power has not
increased.
Although not addressed directly, a review of his analysis of
capital gain disproves Hewett's principle of equality between social
income and aggregate individual incomes. His original statement of
this principle was that "[a]ll individual incomes are obtained from
the social income.''4 Hewett's second category (gains derived from
shifts in supply and demand) illustrates that individual income can
9 An objection to a proposition leading to a deduction for donors is that it produces a
definition of income that is dependent upon the taxpayer's uses, rather than sources, of
economic power. Definitional concern with uses is a trait of a consumption tax, not an in-
come tax.
I W. HE.wFrr, supra note 32, at 23.
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arise without additional production of goods or services. Yet, the
purpose of social income accounting is to measure production. The
concepts described by the terms "individual income" and "social
income" are distinct and should not be linked arbitrarily.
Hewett's efforts led him to define the net income of an indi-
vidual "as the flow of commodities and services accruing to an in-
dividual through a period 'of time and available for disposition
after deducting the necessary cost of acquisition.' '41 This is la-
beled "economic income." Presumably he included money as a
commodity. Failure to do so would reduce the definition to con-
sumption, which Hewett previously had rejected.
Hewett created two alternative definitions of income. First,
the "legal definition of income" is the economic definition modified
to accommodate administrative problems.42 For example, economic
income would include all increases and decreases in property val-
ues accrued during the year. However, because annual appraisals
of all properties are administratively cumbersome, the legal defini-
tion of income imposes a realization requirement.
Second, "taxable income" is legal income modified by concerns
about ability to pay (e.g., the standard deduction) and social or
economic objectives (e.g., tax exempt interest from municipal
bonds).43 Hewett stressed that any of these modifications should
be identified explicitly as elements in the definition of legal or tax-
able income, and not in the fundamental definition of economic
income.
C. Henry C. Simons: Income
Simons' work led him to an income definition very similar to
that of Robert Haig.4" Although their definitions have been labeled
the "Haig-Simons definition of income," and generally accepted as
the accretion definition of income upon which all subsequent dis-
cussions are based, the Simons formulation is cited far more fre-
quently than Haig in modern tax policy literature.
In Simons' view, calculation of social income has a different
purpose than calculation of personal income, and different defini-
tions, therefore, were in order. Also, the requirement that social
41 Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).
42 Id. at 79.
43 Id.
4 See supra note 9.
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income equal the aggregate of individual incomes imposes the un-
pleasant restriction that gifts and certain capital gains (those
based on scarcity factors) must be excluded from individual in-
come because they are excluded from social income.
Robert Haig argued that satisfaction is the fundamental basis
for the definition of income. Irving Fisher built his definition upon
services, both human and those provided by use of goods. William
Hewett looked to the goods themselves, plus the value of human
services received. Henry Simons, however, endorsed a definitional
foundation more abstract than that of Hewett and Fisher, which
avoided the extreme subjectivity of Haig's initial satisfaction the-
ory, and therefore has more practical appeal. In the words of
Simon:
Personal income connotes, broadly, is the exercise of control over
the use of society's scarce resources .... [I]t implies [an] estimate
of consumption and accumulation. Consumption as a quantity de-
notes the value of rights exercised in a certain way (in destruction
of economic goods); accumulation denotes the change in owner-
ship of valuable rights as between the beginning and end of a
period.45
These comments led to his one-sentence definition of income,
which has been quoted almost as a ritual litany in tax policy stud-
ies during the last fifty years: "Personal income may be defined as
the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in
consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of prop-
erty rights between the beginning and end of the period in ques-
tion."46 Because this definition finds income in consumption, and
in any increase in net worth, it will lead to a true income tax and
not to a consumption tax.
Difficulty with in-kind and imputed income is common among
those who attempt to define income. Simons addressed these less
obvious forms, first in connection with his definition of income:
[I]t raises the unanswerable, question as to where or how a line
may be drawn between what is and what is not economic activity.
45 H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF
FISCAL POLICY 49-50 (1938).
41 Id. at 50. The phrase "algebraic sum" is used because the second item in the defini-
tion may be either negative or positive. For example, if the first item, consumption, totals
$32,000, but during the same period the second item, essentially the taxpayer's net worth, is
reduced by $7,000, then $7,000 of the total consumption was funded from prior accumula-
tion and only $25,000 was funded from current income.
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: . . [T]he poorest families might be shown to have substantial
incomes if one went far in accounting for instruction, nursing,
cooking, maid service, and other things which the upper classes
obtain by purchase.
47
Simons observed that the definition was developed specifically
for use in the taxation of income. Therefore, if a flaw in the defini-
tion causes a certain type of income to escape detection and taxa-
tion, no injustice will occur so long as people within a particular
income class all have approximately the same amount of the ne-
glected form of income, and no group is likely to have inordinate
amounts of it. Thus, one can view an income tax as taxing relative
income, and so the definition and measurement of relative incomes
are all that is necessary.
A little reflection along these lines suggests that leisure is it-
self a major item of consumption; that income per hour of leisure,
beyond a certain minimum, might well be imputed to persons ac-
cording to what they might earn per hour- if otherwise engaged. Of
course, it is one thing to note that such procedure is appropriate
in principle and quite another to propose that it be applied. Such
considerations do suggest, however, that the neglect of "earned
income in kind" may be substantially offset, for comparative pur-
poses (for measurement of relative incomes), if leisure income is
also neglected. For income taxation it is important that these ele-
ments of income vary with considerable regularity, from one in-
come class to the next, along the income scale.48
Similar considerations are found in the case of an employee
who receives indirect benefits in addition to his salary.
Let us consider ... the relative incomes of an ordinary of-
ficer serving with his troops and a Flugeladjutant to the sover-
eign. Both receive the same nominal pay; but the latter receives
quarters in the palace, food at the royal table, servants, and hor-
ses for sport. He accompanies the prince to theater and opera,
and, in general, lives royally at no expense to himself and is able
to save generously from his salary. But suppose, as one possible
complication, that the Flugeladjutant detests opera and
hunting.49
Though no bright line can be drawn between indirect benefits
47 Id. at 51-52 (footnote omitted).
48 Id. at 52-53.
49 Id. at 53 (emphasis in original).
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that are income and those that are not, we should attempt to in-
clude the largest of such items in the definition of income. Simons
suggests that the most intangible of such benefits and pleasures
probably vary positively and continuously with income, and so the
failure of his definition to reach them should not cause major dis-
tortions in the measurement of relative income.
Of greatest practical significance is the case of a husband and
wife who both work outside of the home, as compared to a married
couple with one wage earner. Both couples might have the same
total income under an exhaustive definition, but failure to tax the
second couple on income received in kind from services produced
by the spouse at home will cause the first couple to be taxed more
heavily. Partly to deal with this discrimination, from 1982 to 1986
the Code allowed a double-income family to deduct ten percent of
the lower paid spouse's earned income (five percent in 1982), up to
a maximum income of $30,000.0
A related difficulty arises from imputed income from use of
one's own consumer goods. Although not unique in principle, home
ownership is the most significant example; the home is usually the
taxpayer's most valuable consumer asset. Professor Simons
adopted the nearly universal position of endorsing some mecha-
nism to include the rental value of an owner-occupied home in the
owner's income.
[W]hen property is employed directly in consumption uses, there
is the strongest case for recognizing an addition to taxable in-
come. This is widely recognized in criticism of our federal tax for
its egregious discrimination between renters and homeowners,
and perhaps more strikingly in the almost consistently different
practice among income taxes abroad.5 1
... Income from consumers' capital is often a large part of
total income for individuals in the upper brackets. To exclude it
'0 See I.R.C. § 221 (1981) (repealed 1986) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 103, 95 Stat.
172, 187-88 (1981)). Another intended function of the working spouse deduction was to re-
duce the impact of the progressive rate structure on the combined income of the two work-
ing spouses.
" H. SIMoNs, supra note 45, at 112 (footnote omitted).
At all events, the United States and Canada seem to be the only important coun-
tries not taxing rental income to homeowners.... Schanz (writing in 1896!) re-
marks that he knows of only one jurisdiction where rental income to homeowners
is excluded. This is in Mecklenburg. He points out that a similar situation existed
in Basel from 1840 to 1866.
Id. at 112 n.3.
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is to introduce a bias inconsistent with the system of progression
and to differentiate flagrantly among persons of really similar fi-
nancial circumstances. Furthermore, where such income is
excluded, an attractive and easy means of evasion is made avail-
able ...
Serious inequity arises, furthermore, from the fact that the
opportunity for evasion is open to different income classes, and to
members within given classes, on very different terms .... The
real opportunity to escape tax thus varies widely, according to the
consumption tastes of individuals, according to the amount of
property held, and according to the character of one's occupation
and investments.52
Although taxation of imputed income from home ownership
might be criticized on the grounds of administrative difficulty, Pro-
fessor Simons noted that a good approximation of rental value can
be obtained by multiplying the full value of a home, as assessed for
local property taxes, by a selected net rate of return percentage.
Thus, taxpayers would be spared the difficulty of calculating gross
rental value and subtracting actual repair costs and the statutory
allowance for depreciation. He does not mention, however, that use
of a net rate of return percentage would allow a homeowner to con-
tinue to deduct implicit depreciation long past the depreciable life
of the home.5 3 This chapter of Simons' book ends, unfortunately,
without resolution of the problem: "one faces here one of the real
imponderables of income definition."54
Regarding the proper treatment of gifts and inheritances,
Simons adamantly rejected the common conclusion that gifts and
inheritances should be excluded from the definition of income.5 5 If
Simons' general definition is accepted, gifts and inheritances
clearly fit within it. The purely political step of enacting a statu-
52 Id. at 113-15 (footnotes omitted).
" Given the straight-line method and 27.5 year depreciation schedule provided by the
Code today, only a small percentage of taxpayers would enjoy the unintended benefit of
unending depreciation. See I.R.C. § 168(b)(3), (c)(1) (1990). In 1989, statistics indicated that
the average American homeowner held her home for twelve years. Pfister, Housing Turno-
ver Rates: Nation Steady, but Regions Fluctuate, THE GUARANTOR, Sept./Oct. 1990, at 10.
Also, allowing continuous depreciation probably represents good social policy because it
avoids potential pressure on a homeowner to move to a new home when the scheduled de-
preciation term expires.
H. SIMONS, supra note 45, at 124.
" See Haig, supra note 9, at 26. Haig agreed on a theoretical level, but argued against
his tentative conclusion.
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tory exclusion, as found in current United States tax law,"6 is one
possible response, but the theoretical definition should not be dis-
torted to accomplish an exclusion. Inclusion of gifts ,anol inheri-
tances within the definition of income, however, highlights an im-
portant feature of the Simons definition: its blindness as to source.
A review of the definition will reveal that it is equally blind to use.
Simons dispensed with the common suggestion that gifts and
inheritances should not be included in income solely because they
are already taxed under the gift and estate tax system. 7 Further,
some writers have argued that the purpose of the income tax sys-
tem is satisfied because it has taxed the gift one step earlier, when
the funds were earned by the donor. But when a person earns in-
come and then uses some of the dollars earned to pay her doctor,
the income tax system is not "satisfied" with taxing those dollars
only as they are earned by the patient. The same dollars will con-
stitute income again, to be taxed again, upon receipt by the physi-
cian. As Simons says, "[tihe income tax is not a tax upon income
but a tax upon persons according to their respective incomes. '5' In
other words, an income tax-taxes not dollars, but an event, i.e., the
receipt of income. The fact that the patient or donor has borne an
income tax cannot logically prevent taxing the doctor or donee
simply because dollars that represent the former person's income
have been transferred to the latter.
There may be an important distinction between the two fore-
going transactions. The payment from patient to physician is part
of a bilateral exchange of money for services, while the gift from
donor to donee is a unilateral transfer. The life cycle of income
begins with receipt and ends with consumption, with saving as an
optional interim step. The life cycle of a gift, however, can only be
found by tying the donor's receipt of income to the donee's even-
tual consumption.
Giving a gift, however, is a form of consumption by the donor.
The important question is not whether the transaction is bilateral
or unilateral, but whether the transferor receives satisfaction from
the transaction. 9 The voluntary nature of a gift is persuasive evi-
dence that the donor receives satisfaction from the act of giving.
" See I.R.C. § 102 (1990).
' H. SIMONS, supra note 45, at 128.
58 Id.
" The word "satisfaction" is not used in the Haigian sense as a definition of income,
but rather to define consumption.
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The donor, like the patient, has received income and consumed it;
the donee, like the physician, has received income and eventually
will consume it. Both parties in each transaction should therefore
recognize income.
Consider, also, that many large inter vivos gifts are motivated
by the desire to reduce or avoid subsequent income or estate taxes.
Although planned giving is not objectionable, it does remove this
class of gifts from the moral high ground on which one might intui-
tively place family gifts. Finally, "gifts, inheritances, and bequests
is a kind of accumulation which can be taxed with least adverse
effect upon the morale of an enterprise economy.''0
Simons also proposed aggressive treatment of the donor who
gives noncash property. "Every transfer of property by gift should
be treated as a realization, at the fair market value as of the date
of transfer, by the donor." 1 He would apply the same rule to prop-
erty owned at death.2 As a result, the beneficiary's fair market
value basis in inherited property 3 would, for the first time, make
sense, and it could legitimately be extended to calculate the basis
of property received by gift inter vivos.
Although most tax policy literature discussing capital gains
emphasizes economic policy goals, this Article primarily concerns
definitional questions. As long as adjustment is made for inflation,
capital gains are properly included within a theoretical definition
of income. Henry Simons commented that it is "thoroughly un-
sound, as a matter of definition, to set up a category of capital
profits outside (or even within) the income concept."'64
As with capital gains, the tax exemption for interest received
on state and municipal bonds65 is rarely, if ever, defended on the
basis of the theoretical definition of income. Since the Supreme
Court, in South Carolina v. Baker, 6 recently upheld the federal
taxation of state bond interest,6" the constitutional definition of in-
come is no longer an argument.
11 H. SIMONS, supra note 45, at 144.
"I Id. at 166. Simons also stated that the original New York state income tax regula-
tions took this position with respect to both personal and charitable gifts, but the regulation
was rejected by the state courts. Id. at 166 n.7.
02 Id. at 165.
See I.R.C. § 1014 (1990).
H. SIMONS, supra note 45, at 150.
See LR.C. § 103 (1990).
" 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
17 Id. at 524-25.
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Nevertheless, Simons indicated two problem areas. First, the
effects on investment policy are detrimental.
Those who should buy nothing else are turned away from govern-
ment bonds by their scarcity and low yield; and persons who, with
their statisticians and professional analysts, should arbitrate the
direction of new and speculative undertaking can now be at-
tracted away from exempt investments only by prospects of
fabulous yields.6 8
Second, federal subsidies to state and local governments should
not be given in proportion to their borrowing. Federal grants to
state and local governments on the basis of any rational criterion
would make sense out of a currently senseless subsidy. Presaging
Stanley Surrey's tax expenditure concept, 9 Simons noted that it
would be "preposterous" for Congress to allocate direct subsidies
in proportion to borrowing.
Therefore, under Simons' definition, widely adopted as the
most sound theoretical approach, income consists of consumption
plus net saving (or minus net dissaving). Comprehensive images of
consumption and saving limit the compromise of this definition to
explicit political, administrative, social, or economic decisions.
D. William Vickrey: Agenda for Progressive Taxation
William Vickrey has analyzed, on a fundamental level, specific
items of inclusion and exclusion."0 One disadvantage of his ap-
proach is his failure to indicate clearly whether his focus is the
theoretical definition of income or a pragmatic, administrable, po-
litically feasible definition for statutory purposes. In addition to
explicitly endorsing the Haig-Simons definition 7 1 Vickrey specifi-
cally addressed certain definitional proposals. He rejected Fisher's
consumption definition as consisting of mere nomenclature and no
substance. Vickrey also rejected attempts to develop a definition
"I H. SIMONS, supra note 45, at 178.
'9 See Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 706 (1970) (au-
thor describes own tax expenditure concept).
70 William Vickrey received his undergraduate education at Yale and presumably met
Irving Fisher while there. He served on the Department of Treasury's tax research staff
during World War II, partaking in the unsuccessful attempt to enact a wartime spendings
tax. In 1947, Vickrey received a Ph.D. from Columbia University and has been a faculty
member at the university ever since. H. GRovEs, supra note 7, at 110-11.
71 W. VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 6-7 (1947).
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that excludes capital gains: "[I]t appears to be impossible to pro-
duce such a definition that will be internally consistent and not
require hairsplitting distinctions, nor give capricious results."72
Vickrey, however, endorsed the common position that gifts
and bequests should not be included in the recipient's income,
without indicating whether this exists as a fundamental matter of
definition or as a pragmatic matter of tax law.73 With respect to
transfers which occur at death, Vickrey refuted Simons' theory by
noting the difficulty of maintaining "that the testator obtains any
vast satisfaction from the distribution of that which death forces
from his grasp. 71 4 Although he seems willing to accept Simons' rea-
soning with respect to gifts inter vivos, Vickrey rejects the conclu-
sion since "gifts and inheritances are after all mere transfers, and
• . . [they] will frequently not stand up under a heavy tax assessed
solely by reason of ... [that]" transfer.7 5 Vickrey depicted his con-
cern with an illustration involving a grandparent, son, and
grandchild. If giving does not generate a tax liability, in many
cases the grandparent would make a gift to the son, and years later
the son might give the same property to the grandchild, assuming
the property had not been consumed in the meantime. With the
imposition of a tax on each gift, the grandparent is more likely to
make a gift directly to the grandchild, perhaps with an income in-
terest to the son, to avoid tax on the interim transfer, thereby pro-
ducing the economic inefficiencies of trust management.76 Such an
argument could be made with equal force against an effective gift
tax or against any proposal to make the existing gift tax effective.
Unless one is willing to abandon transfer taxation entirely, it sim-
ply goes too far.
Vickrey was correct, however, in his statement that the only
practical alternative to taxing both donor and donee is to tax the
donor and not the donee.7 7 The alternative, which is to tax the do-
nee and allow a deduction to the donor, presents two practical
problems. First, it seriously undermines the progressivity of the
system because donors are generally subject to a higher tax rate
72 Id. at 8.
7 Id. at 198-99. He later stated explicitly that the theoretical definition of income in-
cludes gifts received and that the only theoretical question is whether the donor is entitled
to a deduction. Id. at 199.
74 Id.
76 Id. at 200.
70 Id. at 201.
77 Id.
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than donees. Second, there would be a revenue loss because donors
would claim every available gift deduction, while donees certainly
would not report all gifts received.7
Although he opposes characterization of gift receipts as in-
come, Vickrey endorses the type of separate transfer tax on gifts
enacted under the Code. "Succession taxes are justified primarily
on the ground that they promote equality of opportunity and that
they obtain revenue in a manner that has little effect on incen-
tives.""9 This view effectively supports either an income tax or a
separate succession tax on gifts. Vickrey's intended distinction re-
mains unclear, and, in fact, he elsewhere conceded this. In a pas-
sage criticizing the idea that aggregate individual income must
equal social or national income, he acknowledged the "inconsis-
tency in condemning the double taxation of gifts under.income tax
and then turning around and approving an additional tax on gifts
in the form of succession tax."' 0 Indeed, for one who is willing to
support an effective, separate, gift tax, there is no attractive argu-
ment against Simons' proposal to let the income tax fill a major
part of that role.
With respect to owner-occupied homes, Vickrey took a posi-
tion held almost unanimously among economists: not only is rental
value included in the theoretical definition of income, but it also
should be included in the statutory definition of income.s This
goal can be achieved by imputing full rental value to the owner
and allowing deductions for repairs, interest, taxes, and deprecia-
tion. As a preferred alternative, Vickrey supported Simons' sugges-
tion of applying a net rate of return (net of estimated expenses and
a constant depreciation factor) to the value of the home."'
As a compromise among these alternatives, Vickrey addressed
the provisions which, then and now, allow deduction of property
taxes and mortgage interest paid on owner-occupied housing.8 3
While he asserted that no deduction for property taxes should be
76 Id. at 202.
79 Id.
'0 Id. at 199.
81 Id. at 19.
82 Id. at 19-21.
83 After decades of attack by economists, the deduction for home mortgage interest
finally has some limitation. The interest on home indebtedness incurred after October 31,
1987 in excess of $1,000,000 is not deductible. See I.R.C. § 163(h) (1990). Obviously, this is a
minimal limitation in terms of total national housing and tax policies, but it may set the
stage for more meaningful steps in this direction.
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allowed, he failed to consider whether federalism concerns might
reasonably lead to the interpretation that deductions for sales and
home property taxes follow from deduction for state income
taxes,84 even though the former two would not be deductible from
a purely definitional perspective. With respect to the home mort-
gage interest deduction, which is often criticized unequivocally,
Vickrey makes an important point.
With interest on home mortgages the case is not quite so
clear cut. While eliminating the deduction of such explicit inter-
est without taxing the imputed interest on equities would reduce
the disparity between the tenant and the home-owner with a thin
equity, it will not reduce the disparity between the tenant and
the owner of an unencumbered home, and it will actually intro-
duce new disparities among home-owners having differing equi-
ties in their residences. 5
Since the time of the first United States income tax, payments
of certain other taxes have been deductible for purposes of the fed-
eral income tax."6 A deduction for gasoline taxes was allowed until
1979.87 The deduction for state and local sales tax payments was
repealed in 1986,88 leaving property taxes and state and local in-
come taxes as the only non-business tax payments still allowed as
" See, e.g., McCombs, A New Federal Tax Treatment of State and Local Taxes, 19
PAC. L.J. 747, 750-51 (1988) (discusses federalism argument for applying federal tax treat-
ment to state and local income, property, and sales tax).
85 W. VicKREY, supra note 71, at 22-23. In connection with this discussion, Vickrey also
made an important practical point with respect to all cases in which the definition of taxa-
ble income is narrower than the theoretical definition of net income:
It should be noted that the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction will
increase the tax base and thus permit the rates to be decreased to a corresponding
degree. This may be a distinct advantage in so far as it decreases the intensity of
such other inequities as cannot be eliminated and reduces the effect of the tax on
incentives to production.
Id. at 23-24 (emphasis added). Although the language regarding reducing incentives to pro-
duction has been popularized by the Reagan revolution, the language immediately preceding
it has received little attention.
" See, e.g., Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 91, 12 Stat. 432, 473-74 (1862) (local and
other taxes to be deducted first).
'7 See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 111(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2777 (1978)
(amending 26 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976)) (repeal of deduction for state and local taxes on gaso-
line and other motor fuels).
18 See The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 134(a)(1), 100 Stat. 2085,
2116 (1986) (amending 26 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1985)) ("any tax... which is paid or accrued by
the taxpayer in connection with an acquisition.., of property shall be treated as part of the
cost of the acquired property").
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itemized deductions for individual taxpayers.89 When Vickrey's
Agenda for Progressive Taxation was published, the gasoline tax
deduction was still allowed. He correctly argued against the deduc-
tion on the ground that gasoline taxes are an indirect form of pay-
ing for the use of public roads, because they are in the economic
sense user fees, not taxes.9"
Vickrey did not discuss the common argument in favor of a
federal deduction for state income taxes-that the state income
tax is an unavoidable cost of earning income. The theoretical argu-
ment for deducting state income taxes is strong, if not unassaila-
ble. State income tax liability is highly analogous to a business ex-
pense and presents the strongest case for deductibility at the
federal level. Less certain is whether sales and property tax deduc-
tions (for which the theoretical argument is weaker because they
arise from consumption rather than production activities) should
nevertheless be allowed on the strength of the federalism concern
for allowing free state choice of revenue sources. 1
Vickrey referred to this federalism concern as "discrimina-
tion" between states, and described an alternative response to it:
If the discrimination resulting between states using income taxes
and those using other forms of taxation is deemed too great, it
might be possible to provide for the deduction of only the excess
of the state income tax over a given amount or over a given per-
centage of income. This restriction would limit the discrimination
to the areas where it is needed to prevent confiscation and where
it is most effective in promoting progressive taxation by the
states, and would also remove one more unnecessary item from
the returns of small taxpayers.92
If the annual or biennial ritual of massive tax reform acts is
finally waning, perhaps the relative quietude will allow the tax
treatment of life insurance to receive the attention and analysis it
deserves. Even without a stable legislative backdrop, perhaps the
revenue pressures of our current era will force life insurance to the
front of the stage. Vickrey believed that the savings component of
the life insurance contract is analogous to a savings account, and
should be handled as other forms of savings. The interest should
be included in the policyholder's income but the proceeds which
See I.R.C. § 164 (1990).
W. VicKRFY, supra note 71, at 94-95.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 100.
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represent the return of principal should be excluded.93
Finally, Vickrey vigorously advocated the inclusion of capital
gains in income:
[U]nder any consistent form of tax based on accrued income
these gains should be included in income and taxed just as heav-
ily as any other form of income. Although it has been urged in
season and out that capital gains of one kind or another should be
excluded from taxable income, no method of doing this that does
not involve gross discrimination, hairline distinctions, and oppor-
tunities for avoidance has been devised, short of going all the way
to a spendings tax.94
Furthermore, in his opinion, England's declining to tax capital
gains does not present an argument for the adoption of the same
rule in the United States. He asserted that not only is tax law
more strictly interpreted in this country, but "tax avoidance is a
favorite indoor sport and regarded as a sign of business acumen
and the exercise of a basic civil right, rather than as unpatriotic or
bad form. '95
Vickrey also found little merit in three arguments commonly
raised in discussions of capital gains. "The first is that through
postponing the realization of income generally and of capital gains
in particular, the taxpayer gains to the extent of the interest he is
able to earn on the amount of the tax postponed."9 6 This argument
would lead to a higher rate of tax on gains from assets held for a
long time, but Vickrey does not endorse such a rule. "Second,
under progressive rates, if a taxpayer realizes in a single year a
large gain that has accrued over a number of years, his income may
be pushed into higher brackets and taxed at higher rates than if he
had been able to report the income gradually as it accrued. '9 7
Vickrey accepts this proposition as a serious concern, although it is
less significant today due to the much smaller range from the low-
est to highest tax rate. In a later chapter, he constructs a very com-
plicated program for lifetime cumulative income averaging, includ-
ing an interest factor on income earned and taxes paid in prior
11 Id. at 65 ("savings part of the life insurance contract should be treated as any other
form of savings; ... the interest should be included in the income of the policyholder...
but proceeds representing the return of principal should not be included").
04 Id. at 136 (footnote omitted).
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years, to avoid problems from the time value of money. 8
Third, "if there is a general inflation or deflation of the price
level, capital gains or losses will be recorded which do not re-
present any real change in economic power or net worth."9 Al-
though Vickrey notes the possibility of indexing asset bases for in-
flation, he is not sufficiently concerned with this problem to
endorse that solution. With respect to these three concerns,
Vickrey notes that "none of the treatments accorded [to capital
gains and losses] bears any logical relation to any of these special
problems: allowing for these factors leads to quite different
schemes of taxation." 100
Vickrey began his treatment of capital gains with the theoreti-
cal ideal that all of a taxpayer's capital assets should be appraised
at the beginning and end of each year. Increases in value should be
included in income and decreases should be deducted. But for
many types of assets, such an appraisal cannot be accomplished
accurately. Nor can it be achieved administratively, due to the
enormity of the task, even for those assets whose value could be
reasonably estimated. The traditional response to this problem has
been to defer measurement of gain or loss from property until the
property has been disposed of in a "realization" transaction. In
most cases such a disposition is a sale for a stated cash price, al-
though the payment may be made immediately or in installments.
The sale price represents an arm's length appraisal in the medium
by which taxes are measured and paid, without government inter-
vention or involvement in the appraisal process.
An exchange of one item of property for another is also a reali-
zation event, but because only a small minority of property dispo-
sitions are made for noncash consideration, the category of trans-
actions in which the government must demand an appraisal is
relatively small. Vickrey was convinced, however, that "there are
schemes of defining realization that will more closely approximate
a proper tax base and lead to fewer discriminations than the pre-
sent collection of incongruities. '" 10 1
He was particularly dissatisfied with the complete escape from
98 Id. at 164-97. "Vickrey's ingenious proposal, in spite of its undoubted merits, ranks
high on the list of proposals too subtle and elaborate for Congress. ... H. GROVEs, supra
note 7, at 111.
" W. VICKREY, supra note 71, at 144.
2oo Id.
101 See id. at 138.
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tax of gain accrued in property held by a taxpayer at death. This
escape is due to the combination of the failure to tax the decedent
on the gain inherent in her property, and the allowance of a fair
market value basis to the beneficiary of the estate.102 A partial es-
cape from tax, of a similar nature, is often achieved when appreci-
ated property is given to another person. As in the case of death,
the transferor is not taxed on gain inherent in the property. Unlike
the treatment of an inheritance, however, the recipient of the gift
is required to use the transferor's historical basis for calculation of
gain when the property is later sold. 10 3 In spite of this carry-over
basis rule, there is often a partial escape from tax because the do-
nor is nearly always in a higher tax bracket than the donee. Al-
though the difference between donor and donee tax rates is much
smaller today than it was then, it is still significant. Also, although
Vickrey did not mention it, even if both parties pay tax at the
same rate, the failure to treat a gift as a realization event causes
the government to suffer loss of the time value of money from the
date of the gift until the donee sells the property.
Vickrey's solution to the problems associated with inheritance
and gifts was to require realization of the inherent gain/loss at the
time of transfer. There is no objective reasoning against his propo-
sal regarding gifts. The donor can easily provide the basis for com-
putation. Because under current law, all gifts over $10,000 in
value-20,000 if given by a husband and wife jointly' 0 -4 -have
some kind of gift tax consequences, any gifted property with an
estimated value close to $10,000 must be appraised. For gifts
clearly worth less than $10,000 (or $20,000, where applicable), a
realization requirement would mandate an appraisal where one is
not currently required. If such appraisal is difficult to achieve, the
donative intent usually can be satisfied by giving a different piece
of property with a more easily determined market value.
The proper solution is not so clear in the case of transfers at
death. The major difference is the unknown basis; the only person
who reasonably can be required to know and state the property's
basis is dead. It would greatly burden the personal representative
of the estate to determine the basis of each item of property left by
the decedent.10 5
102 See I.R.C. § 1014 (1990) (basis of property acquired from decedent).
,3 See id. § 1015 (basis of property acquired by gifts and transfers in trust).
:04 See id. § 2503(b) (exclusion from gifts).
1 5 See id. § 1023 (1976) (repealed 1980) (provided basis carry-over from the decedent
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Vickrey's response to the problem of unknown basis seems
eminently reasonable and theoretically sound, but is politically im-
possible; it would only exacerbate the protests of would-be per-
sonal representatives. Vickrey asserted that
[i]t would seem entirely reasonable for the tax assessor to assume
a very low basis in the absence of data, and place the burden of
proof on the executor to show any higher basis. This would place
on the decedent the responsibility for keeping adequate records,
if he wished his estate to have favorable tax treatment.1 06
Where the personal representative believes that the decedent's ba-
sis was higher than the tax assessor's presumed basis, the same
objectionable pressure would be placed upon the representative to
struggle 'through piles of incomplete records to produce the neces-
sary evidence. 107
We can therefore see that no single definitional theory has
both logical cohesiveness and acceptable political consequences.
No matter the economic or policy arguments asserted, United
States income tax law represents an amalgam of the various theo-
to his estate and its beneficiaries for decedents dying after 1976) (enacted by the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005, 90 Stat. 1520, 1872-79 (1976)). In 1978, the
effective date was delayed to January 1, 1980. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600,
§ 515, 92 Stat. 2763, 2884 (1978). In 1980, the entire section was repealed, without ever
having been applied. See Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223,
§ 401, 94 Stat. 229, 299-301 (1980).
106 W. VICKREY, supra note 71, at 140-41.
107 There is, however, an approach that can avoid such criticism. This alternative pro-
posal begins, as did Vickrey's, with the observation that the burden of determining fair
market value must be an acceptable one, because under current law personal representatives
must value every item to establish the new basis of that item in the hands of the estate and
the beneficiary. It would be a minor imposition to require the representative to multiply the
fair market value of each item by, for example, 70% (0.7). If the resulting figure is conclu-
sively treated as the basis for 'all further tax purposes, there is no "burden of proof on the
executor to show any higher basis," as there is in Vickrey's original proposal. Thus, there is
no requirement, or command performance "opportunity," to find and use historical basis
information.
An expanded version of this proposal could be used by those who agree with Simons
that inheritance constitutes income and should be taxed. Rather than multiplying the fair
market value of each inherited item by 70%, as suggested above, every inherited asset could
be given a zero basis in the hands of the beneficiary. Upon ultimate disposition of the asset,
the entire sale price would be income. The government would suffer the time value of
money burden in the meantime, but for those who consider inheritance to be income and an
involuntary, noncash disposition, such as transfer at death, an inappropriate time to impose
tax liability (on either party), the deferral cost will be acceptable. If the administrative bur-
den on personal representatives is genuinely a major issue, this approach is better than the
current law. In this case none of the assets of the decedent would require appraisal for
income tax purposes.
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ries discussed above.
II. PROGRESSIVITY AND PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS
Progressivity is one of the most emotional issues addressed in
tax policy. As a consequence, it has resulted in a great volume of
writing and notably three classic treatises-one which endorses it
enthusiastically;108 a second which supports it if the degree of pro-
gression is moderate;109 and the third work which adamantly op-
poses progressive taxation."0
A. E.R.A. Seligman: The Historical View
In Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice, Professor
Seligman set forth the history of progressive taxation in the United
States. With the adoption of the 1862 Tax Act, Congress intro-
duced a progressive rate system: three percent on incomes from
$600 to $10,000, and five percent on incomes above $10,000."' Ac-
cording to Seligman, the progressive feature was a matter of some
discussion:
Secretary [of the Treasury] Fessenden, in his report for 1864, de-
fended the progressive income tax in the following words: "The
adoption of a scale augmenting the rate of taxation upon incomes
as they rise in amount, although unequal in one sense, cannot be
considered oppressive or unjust, inasmuch as the ability to pay
increases in much more than arithmetical proportion as the
amount of income exceeds the limit of reasonable necessity." 112
Apparently, the progressive feature- was considered a greater
evil than income tax generally. In 1867, with the expenses of war
removed from the budget, the tax was retained; the rate structure,
however, was changed to a proportional one." 3 Many in Congress
108 H. SIMONS, supra note 45.
09 E.R.A. SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATIoN IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1908).
110 W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953).
1 See Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473 (1862). An odd aspect of this
rate structure was the provision that, upon crossing the $10,000 threshold, the 5% rate ap-
plied to the taxpayer's entire income above $600. As a result, a taxpayer with $10,000 of
income would owe a $282 tax, while one with $10,001 of income would owe $470.05.
11 E.R.A. SELIGMAN, supra note 109, at 102 (quoting Report of the Secretary of the
Treasury, 1864, at 15). The phrase "ability to pay" is one of many phrases, each backed by
different reasoning and theories, that have developed in the centuries of discussion of
progressivity.
11 See Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 477-80 (1867).
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viewed this tax strictly as a war measure and called for its repeal
shortly after such expenses abated.114 Due to a revenue shortage,
the tax was extended to include incomes of 1871, payable in 1872,
and was allowed to expire immediately thereafter."'
To discuss the issue of progressive tax rates, brief comments
on terminology are in order:
A tax may be said to be proportional when the mathematical
relation between the amount of the tax and that of the thing
taxed remains the same. A tax is progressive when the relation
varies in such a way that, as the amount taxed itself increases, the
tax will represent a continually larger fraction of that amount.1 6
Seligman defined a degressive system as one having progres-
sive rates up to a certain level and a constant tax rate thereafter."'
He admitted, almost grudgingly, that this description fit every pro-
gressive tax system because rate increases can- never continue in-
definitely. But he added that a degressive tax is one in which the
highest rate is considered the "normal" one." 8 The lower rates are
thus considered concessions to lower income taxpayers, a middle
step between the full, normal rate applied to higher incomes and
the complete exemption granted to the lowest income levels."' Se-
114 In 1870, when the Civil War income tax was, by its terms, scheduled to expire, there
was some support for its continuance. In response, Representative McCarthy of New York
replied:
[Tihis income tax bears, what no other tax bears upon its face, the evidence that
it was only considered and passed as a war tax, being limited to five years in its
duration. The five years are up; the war is over; our revenue will bear the reduc-
tion, and we can afford to let it die.... The people demand that it shall not be
renewed, but left to die a natural death and pass away into the future as pass
away all the evils growing out of the civil war.
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3993 (1870).
11 See Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 6, 16 Stat. 256, 257 (1870).
16 E.R.A. SELIGMAN, supra note 109, at 3 (emphasis added).
117 Id. at 4.
11 Id.
"1 Id. at 5. "Degression" was a term also used by Professors Blum and Kalven in The
Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, see supra note 110, with a more specific and mean-
ingful definition. Degressive taxation in their view is a system that provides an exemption,
or a zero rate of tax, to a subsistence amount of income (as provided by our standard deduc-
tion and personal exemptions), followed by a single rate applicable to all income above the
exempt amount. This is not a truly proportional tax relative to total income, for it produces
a modest amount of progression in the average tax rates. For example, if the exempt amount
is $9,000 and the constant tax rate above that amount is 30%, a taxpayer with $18,000 of
taxable income will pay a $2,700 tax, or 15% of total income; a taxpayer with $27,000 of
taxable income will pay $5,400 of tax, or 20% of total income. The average rate rises even
though the marginal rate is constant.
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ligman concluded that the trend seemed to move toward progres-
sive taxation.120
Seligman identified three major classes of theories favoring
progressive taxation: the socialistic, the compensatory, and the eco-
nomic. According to the socialistic theory, governments of an ear-
lier age imposed taxes primarily for the purpose of generating reve-
nue to pay for their operations. Although revenue continues to be
important, in the modern era, governments also use taxation to
achieve social, political, and economic effects. Seligman then went
on to adopt a revised view of the socialistic theory which seemed
like an extremist version of itself, 2' without announcing or admit-
ting to it.
It is not true historically that the tax policy of various nations has
been adjusted solely with reference to purely fiscal reasons. All
governments have allowed social considerations in the wider sense
to influence their revenue policy...
But, on the other hand, it is not allowable to confound this
undoubtedly social element in all fiscal policy with what [German
economist Professor Adolph] Wagner calls the socio-political, or
what might be termed not incorrectly the socialistic element.
From the principle that the state may modify its strict fiscal pol-
icy by considerations of general social utility to the principle that
it is the duty of the state to redress inequalities of fortune by
taxation, is a long and dangerous step. It would land us not only
in socialism, but practically in communism. If this were one of the
acknowledged functions of government, it would be useless to
construct any science of finance. There would be only one simple
principle: confiscate the property of the rich and give it to the
poor.' 22
An open-minded view of Wagner's theory would admit that it
does not describe early tax policy as being solely fiscal, nor does it
advocate that modern governments use taxation to eliminate ine-
qualities of income or wealth. It would be more reasonable to say
that, according to Wagner, the degree of nonfiscal considerations in
taxation has increased, and that one significant nonfiscal consider-
ation is the reduction of economic inequality. This interpretation
120 E.R.A. SELIGMAN, supra note 109, at 125.
221 See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
122 E.R.A. SELIGMAN, supra note 109, at 130-31 (emphasis added). "[B]ut we clearly
transcend the claims of justice when we demand that the state should do away with all
inequalities of wealth." Id. at 131 (emphasis added). Seligman's treatment of Wagner's the-
ory was later criticized by Henry Simons. See infra text accompanying note 146.
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leads to the conclusion that Wagner's theory takes a defensible
view of the trend in this area, and also avoids the confusion of
moderate socialism with communism.123
Seligman addressed the arguments of Francis Walker in a sec-
ond category, which he labeled "compensatory theories. ' ' 124 Walker
perceived serious flaws in the market mechanisms that lead to dra-
matic differences in the financial success of different individuals:
[Walker] bases his defense of progressive taxation on two consid-
erations: first, "the undoubted fact that differences of property
and income are due, in no small degree, to the failure of the state
in its duty of protecting men against violence and fraud," and
secondly, "that differences in wealth are, in a measure, due to the
acts of the state itself, having no political purpose, as treaties of
commerce, tariffs, currency legislation, embargoes, non-inter-
course acts, wars, etc.1125
Walker proposed using progressive taxation to recapture some
of these financial advantages from their undeserving owners. 126
This proposal is vulnerable, of course, because, even if one sympa-
thized with Walker's judgment concerning the flaws of the market,
there is no close correlation between total income and this particu-
123 Other authors Seligman discussed explicitly proposed complete economic equaliza-
tion of the citizenry via taxation. For example, Guicciardini, in the early 16th century,
wrote:
Even a moderately progressive tax... will not suffice to bring about justice and
equality, because it would not restrict the rich man in the same degree as the poor
man in the satisfaction of his necessities. For since we are all citizens of the same
state and each the equal of the other, there can be no true equality or justice in
taxation unless the taxes reduce us all to the same economic level. For to have too
much wealth does not do any one any good, but on the contrary is a dangerous
thing not only for the body politic, but for the citizens at large, and even for the
owners [of the wealth] themselves. If, then, we introduce the progressive principle
we shall become truly equal as we reasonably ought to be.
Id. at 135-36 (footnotes omitted) (E.R.A. Seligman trans.); see also id. at 136-37 (equaliza-
tion proponents in the French Revolution).
1' 1 WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA (1607-1896) 556 (1963). Francis Walker was president
of Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1881 until his death in 1897, and also taught
economics at Yale.
125 E.R.A. SELIGMAN, supra note 109, at 143 (quoting F. WALKER, POLITICAL ECONOMY,
479-80 (1st ed. 1883)).
12 Id. at 143.
This defense of progressive taxation is ... not new with President Walker. Pro-
gressive taxation was first advocated at length on this ground in the remarkable
work of a woman, Mile. Royer, which was [awarded a prize] by the Council of
State of Vaud, in Switzerland, at the time of the great international convention on
taxation in Lausanne in 1860.
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lar category of undeserved income for any particular person.
Seligman referred to this argument as the general compensa-
tory theory. Its cousin, the special compensatory theory, springs
from quite different intellectual roots but also used progressive
taxation to compensate for other elements in the economy. The
special compensatory theory inquires whether the net effect of all
other components of national, state, and local tax systems (other
than the income tax) is regressive. If it is, a progressive income tax
can be added, with the degree of progressivity calculated to offset
the net regressivity in the other taxes. Of course, this theory places
a limit on the amount of income tax progression that can be justi-
fied. Seligman called it "only ostensible progression. 1 27 A different
theoretical basis is necessary if one desires a total tax structure
with net progressivity.
One early theory, which was developed to explain and justify
taxation in general, was called the benefit theory. This is one that
Seligman included in his category of "economic theories," and it
adopts the simplistic view that taxes constitute payments for ser-
vices provided by government to citizens.
Since protection was generally regarded as the chief function of
the state, the conclusion was drawn that taxes must be adjusted
to the protection afforded. Taxes were looked upon as premiums
of insurance which individuals paid to the collective insurance
company-the state-in order to enjoy their possessions in peace
and security. 128
Seligman's view leads to the conclusion that if one taxpayer
has twice as much property or income (whichever base is being
used) as another taxpayer, the wealthier individual has twice as
much to lose, thus enjoying twice the benefit of the less wealthy
person. A proportionate rate structure is the inevitable result of
the benefit theory.
A slightly more sophisticated version of this idea, one recog-
nizing David Ricardo's point that "the power of paying taxes is in
proportion to the net, and not in proportion to the gross reve-
nue,' 129 applies the proportionate tax rate only to income above a
certain exempt amount. The exemption might be a subsistence
127 Id. at 147.
128 Id. at 150.
21 Id. at 151 (quoting D. RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLrrIcAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION ch.
xxvi (1817)). Ricardo (1772-1823) was one of the leading English economists of the 19th
century. Id.
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amount or could be calculated to include some degree of basic
comfort above subsistence. The meaning and effect of Ricardo's
statement can best be illustrated numerically, as in the following
example. If subsistence requires $1,000 per year, a taxpayer earn-
ing $1,500 has only $500 available for the payment of taxes. A
twenty percent tax rate in a system that provides no exemption
will claim $300, which is sixty percent of the $500 from which the
tax must be paid. A taxpayer with a $5,000 income will pay $1,000
in tax, which constitutes only twenty-five percent of that person's
available income. Thus, a rate structure that appears proportionate
on its surface can be highly regressive in operation if a subsistence
exemption is not allowed. 1 0
Seligman provided a similar analysis of the effect of an exemp-
tion, although he approached it from a different direction. He
stated: "[P]roportional taxation of clear income, i.e., income above
a fixed minimum, is actually degressive taxation of total income.
Thus without being aware of it many advocates of so-called pro-
portional taxation really favor non-proportional taxation."''
A constant tax rate combined with a personal exemption pro-
duces a tax that is proportionate with respect to net income above
the exemption, but progressive with respect to total income. In
contrast, a tax with increasing rates for increasing levels of net in-
come above a personal exemption will be progressive with respect
to both net income and total income. When Seligman claimed that
supporters of a constant rate tax with an exemption are unwit-
tingly supporting "non-proportional taxation,"'3 2 he has, to some
extent, unwittingly classified proponents of apples with supporters
of oranges.'
Ultimately, Seligman rejected the benefit theory:
This whole method of [benefit theory] argument, however, is
inconclusive. The question of advantages which an individual de-
rives from governmental action is a psychological one. It does not
logically lead either to proportion, or to progressive or to regres-
1"0 Similarly, a tax system that is proportionate relative to net income above the ex-
emption will be moderately progressive, relative to total income. One must make an individ-
ual decision about which tax base is most appropriate for use as a standard in measuring
progressivity or regressivity of competing proposals for tax rules and rates.
131 E.R.A. SELIGMAN, supra note 109, at 151-52.
132 Id. at 152.
133 Blum and Kalven analyzed the difference between these two tax types in greater
detail, but overlooked the key point, namely, the difference in the tax base used to deter-
mine progressivity or proportionality. See supra note 110.
[Vol. 64:471
U.S. TAX POLICY SCHOLARSHIP
sive taxation. The degree to which a taxpayer values the public
art galleries, or the public concerts, or clean streets, or the deci-
sions of the courts, or the thousand and one other benefits con-
ferred by state action, depends on a multiplicity of motives which
may differ in every individual case.
13 4
Another idea which Seligman discussed is the "faculty con-
cept," the historical forebear of our modern concept of "ability to
pay." "Faculty," however, had a distinctly proportionate flavor,
while "ability to pay" is now found on the tongues of those with
progressive rates in mind. A common feature is that both look to
what the taxpayer has, rather than to the benefits he receives from
the government. Several of the British colonies in America adopted
taxes based on faculty.'
As the standard for measuring faculty changed from property
to income, the propriety of a subsistence exemption under the
faculty theory became recognized. Seligman credited this exemp-
tion with the broadening of the theoretical focus from production
of income alone to the later inclusion of consumption of income.
The new consciousness of consumption as a relevant matter in tax-
ation, he maintained, then led to the idea of trying to evaluate the
amount of sacrifice borne by a taxpayer.
The original idea, as we have seen, was that of production .
Both property and income, as tests of faculty, had regard to con-
ditions of production. As soon, however, as a demand was made
for the exemption of the minimum of subsistence, a new factor
was introduced,-namely, the conditions of consumption. What
the individual received or produced in the way of income was no
longer the only consideration; the ability to apply this product to
the satisfaction of his necesary wants became an equally congent
factor.
... Equality of pressure, or equality of sacrifice, now became
a fundamental consideration; and faculty, or capacity to pay
taxes, was henceforth declared to be measured by that proportion
of his product or income, the loss of which would impose upon
the individual an equal burden or sacrifice with his neighbor. 138
Seligman's discussion of the faculty concept leads naturally
into his analysis of the equal sacrifice theory. This theory centers
around the decreasing marginal utility of money. A dollar is more
134 E.R.A. Seligman, supra note 109, at 155.
' See id. at 267-72.
'0 Id. at 209-10.
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precious to a poor person than to a wealthy person. If the assump-
tion that the marginal utility of money declines as income in-
creases is accepted, it provides an irrefutable argument against a
head tax. Obviously a $100 tax on a poor person imposes a much
greater burden than a $100 tax on a wealthy person. Justification
of proportionate taxation under this theory, however, requires the
conclusion not only that a rich person values a dollar less than a
poor person, but also that a person with $100,000 of taxable in-
come places as much value on (or receives as much satisfaction
from) $1,000 as a person with $10,000 of taxable income places on
$100. Even if it is agreed that the wealthier person places a lower
value on a dollar, there is no proof that she values a dollar only
one-tenth as much as the poorer taxpayer. An economist would
claim that, even though we have concluded that the marginal util-
ity curve slopes downward, we do not know the rate or angle of
that downward slope.
Under Seligman's analysis, the equal sacrifice theory gains
enough strength to carry us one additional step, from simple rejec-
tion of a head tax to a confident justification of proportionate taxa-
tion. He interpreted the term "equal sacrifice" to mean, more pre-
cisely, proportional sacrifice.' 37 By way of example, consider that
truly equal dollar taxation imposes a tax of $100 on every tax-
payer, regardless of income. Truly equal taxation based on the sac-
rifice theory, however, looks to each person's income, but only for
the purpose of determining the amount of satisfaction that a tax-
payer in a particular income bracket gets from a dollar. If one con-
cluded that a person with a $100,000 income gets only half as
much satisfaction from a dollar as does a person with a $10,000
income, then the former would pay a $200 tax and the latter, $100.
In this example, the dollar amounts are not equal, although the
amounts of sacrifice, or satisfaction lost, are.
Similarly, a proportional dollar tax would take $1,000 from the
$100,000 per year person and $100 from the $10,000 per year per-
son. A proportional satisfaction tax, in attempting to take satisfac-
tions (or impose sacrifice) in the same ratio as the income of the
two individuals (10 to 1), will take $2,000 from the high income
taxpayer and $100 from the low income taxpayer (again, assuming
that the former finds only half as much satisfaction in her margi-
nal dollars as does the latter). Therefore, Seligman's proposal that
"I7 See id. at 214.
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the term "equal sacrifice" be interpreted to mean proportional sac-
rifice equips this theory with the power to justify a modest degree
of dollar progressivity.
Further, a tax that is proportionate with respect to total in-
come is regressive with respect to income above a subsistence ex-
emption. A tax that is proportionate with respect to income above
an exemption is progressive with respect to total income. Similar
potential for confusion exists when we presume that satisfaction
per dollar decreases as income increases. Implicitly, then, a tax
that is proportionate with respect to dollars will be regressive with
respect to satisfaction and a tax that is proportionate with respect
to satisfaction will be progressive with respect to dollars. Selection
of the appropriate tax base, for comparison and analysis of the ef-
fects of various taxes, is essential to a valid characterization and a
clear understanding of the results.
Seligman also noted that various authors have concluded that
the faculty theory leads to proportional taxation, degressive taxa-
tion, and progressive taxation. Professor Thomas Nixon Carver
placed a different twist on the equal sacrifice theory, stating that
"the really logical equality of sacrifice is the equality of marginal
sacrifice." '138 Thus, achieving equality of marginal sacrifice from
taxation may require the government to impose taxes only on indi-
viduals with the highest incomes. As they are "taxed down" gradu-
ally to the income level of their less wealthy, untaxed neighbors,
the neighbors can be added to the taxable group. Additional reve-
nue needs would be satisfied by this larger group. The goal is to
minimize the amount of satisfaction sacrificed by the group as a
whole. The government, therefore, would always take dollars that
represent the lowest amount of satisfaction, namely, dollars held
by those taxpayers who have the highest remaining incomes. 139
Carver concluded that this reasoning was only the first step in a
two-step process. Although a truly just distribution of the burdens
of taxation is "the least evil to the least number[,] ... [t]he evils of
taxation. . . are two-fold-the sacrifice to those who pay the taxes
and the repression of industry and of enterprise which the taxes
occasion. ' '1140
Seligman rejected Carver's proposition in a way that reflects
1' Id. at 287.
13 See id. at 285-86. This same reasoning was developed by English economist F.Y.
Edgeworth, although immediately rejected as impractical communism. Id.
140 Id. at 287 (emphasis added).
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the fact that many turn-of-the-century commentators on progres-
sivity had not yet recognized that very high income tax rates might
cause a substantial reduction in gross national product. Perhaps
today we ascribe to this idea too much power, over too broad a
range of rates. As one scholar has recently noted, we have had
some exceedingly good economic years in conjunction with some
very high tax rates.141 In the early twentieth century, the potential
economic repression from high rates was not widely acknowledged,
and progressivity was addressed more frequently on purely ethical
grounds. For example, Seligman refuted Carver's ingenious argu-
ment by alleging that this "repression" is not caused by progres-
sive rates. Specifically, Seligman asserted that "[t]he repressive-
ness of a tax is due far more to the nature of the tax than to any
scale of graduation.' 142 Today, one need not be a supply-side econ-
omist to have greater concern than Seligman showed for the possi-
ble magnitude of income tax effects on saving, risk taking, and en-
trepreneurial efforts. More than eighty years later, Carver's
analysis, combining one highly theoretical element with another
very practical element, is appealing in both approach and
conclusion.
B. Henry C. Simons: The Ethical View
Thirty years after Seligman wrote, Henry Simons provided a
much more sensitive approach to the indirect economic costs that
might result from taxation. Economist Harold Groves described
Simons' view toward this issue:
[Simons believed that government] in general, though having
many benevolent potentialities, should be closely circumscribed
among other reasons because taxes are costly in terms of
repression.
Simons had a deep interest in reducing inequality, and al-
241 See Graetz, The Truth About Tax Reform, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 617, 626 (1988). The
author believes that dramatic reductions in the maximum individual tax rates do "not seem
likely to have major economic significance" and while low tax rates have at times been ac-
companied by good times, the connection is no more than coincidental. Id.
142 E.R.A. SELIGMAN, supra note 109, at 288. Carver stated that "[a] progressive tax is
therefore to be commended unless the rate of progression is made so high as to discourage
the receivers of large incomes from trying to increase them." Id. at 288 n.10 (quoting from
Carver, The Minimum Sacrifice Theory of Taxation, 19 POL. Sci. Q. 66, 79 (1904)). Selig-
man replied that "[n]o tax short of one hundred percent would completely discourage this,
and at all events it would take far more than the 'moderately progressive tax,' of which
Professor Carver speaks, to accomplish this result." Id. at 289 n.10.
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though he thought that this must be at some price in terms of
aggregate output, he conceived the goal as worth the price.143
In days gone by, the field we now know as economics was re-
ferred to as political economy. Today, economists have dropped
the term "political" from their titles in an attempt to convince the
world that their arguments and conclusions are scientific, objec-
tive, and free from political bias. Simons, however, was not of-
fended by the presence of political values in economic writing; his
concern was that the political element be admitted at the outset,
and identified to some extent rather than hidden under a cloak of
scientific neutrality.
It has become conventional among students of fiscal policy
... to dissemble any underlying social philosophy and to main-
tain a pretense of rigorous, objective analysis untinctured by mere
ethical considerations. The emptiness of this pretense among
economists is notorious; yet people who cannot solve a simultane-
ous equation still regard "unscientific" as the ultimate in critical
invective and themselves live in constant terror of that character-
ization. Having been told that sentiments are contraband in the
realm of science, they religiously eschew a few proscribed phrases,
clutter up title-pages and introductory chapters with pious refer-
ences to the science of public finance, and then write monumental
discourses upon their own prejudices and preconceptions. 144
Simons, in contrast, laid his politics, refreshingly, out on the
table, reflecting his views of depression-era attitudes and programs
relevant to his topic:
Taxation is the proper means for mitigating inequalities; and,
confining attention to this field of economic policy, one naturally
places more emphasis upon that objective than would be appro-
priate in a less restricted discussion. ...
. . . Fine sentiments about economic justice are now em-
ployed mainly in support of schemes which, in spite of all good
intentions, must serve to aggravate inequality, to make poorer a
community which at best will be poor enough, and to undermine
a political system which we overwhelmingly prefer to the authori-
tarian alternatives. Thus, I would suggest . . . not merely that
progressive taxation is a sound and promising method for mitigat-
ing inequality but that it is the only sound and promising method
which has seriously been proposed and that other currently popu-
14 H. GROVES, supra note 7, at 75.
14, H. SiMONS, supra note 45, at 1-2.
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lar schemes are unsound technically and incompatible with the
kind of total arrangements which we wish to preserve against the
recently prevailing world-trend.145
Earlier, we found German economist Adolph Wagner verbally
flogged and labeled a communist by Seligman. Now, we find
Simons coming to his rescue, and specifically defending him
against Seligman. Simons supported Wagner's advocacy to recog-
nize the effect of taxation in changing the distribution of wealth
and income. He rejected Seligman's "facility," as a mere disguise
for people who do not want to face directly the ethical and political
questions of proper distribution of income.14 In his treatise,
Simons also revealed an analysis of taxation which builds toward
Carver's two-part approach.147 The author stated that "every in-
crease in the degree of progression is, with reference merely to dis-
tributional effects, a desirable change, and without limit short of
substantial equality among those taxed.1' 48 Shortly thereafter, it
becomes clear that Simons was presenting his own case. "The case
for drastic progression in taxation must be rested on the case
against inequality-on the ethical or aesthetic judgment that the
prevailing distribution of wealth and income reveals a degree (and/
or kind) of inequality which is distinctly evil or unlovely. 1 49
Finally, his reasoning crystallized, paralleling that of Carver,' 5"
although he did not cite or discuss Carver's work in this regard.
Such a view obviously takes account merely of the distribu-
tional effects of progression. Indeed, that is as far as traditional
discussions of justice in taxation may properly go. Yet this is ob-
viously but one side of the problem. The degree of progression in
a tax system may also affect production and the size of the na-
tional income available for distribution. In fact, it is reasonable to
expect that every gain, through taxation, in better distribution
will be accompanied by some loss in production. The real problem
of policy, thus, is that of weighing the one set of effects against
the other. 151
The causes behind this threatened loss in production (Selig-
"' Id. at v-vii.
146 Id. at 15-16.
1' See supra text accompanying note 140.
14' H. SIMONS, supra note 45, at 17-18; see also supra text accompanying notes 139-41.
149 H. SIMONS, supra note 45, at 18-19.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 138-40.
151 H. SIMONS, supra note 45, at 19.
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man's "repression") 152 need further attention. Simons identified
them as the effects of progressive taxation: "(a) upon the supplies
of highly productive, or at least handsomely rewarded, personal
services, (b) upon the use of available physical resources, (c) upon
the efficiency of enterpriser activity, and (d) upon the accumula-
tion and growth of resources through saving. ' 153 Effects of the first
three potential causes of lost production are cast off as insignifi-
cant, at least within any range of progressive rates that is likely to
emerge from the political process.1
54
The adverse effect on saving, however, is recognized as a sig-
nificant, indirect cost of progressive taxation. As compared to a
proportional tax that raises the same amount of revenue, a pro-
gressive tax takes more dollars from high income taxpayers who
are most likely to have saved some of those dollars. The tax sav-
ings caused by a change from a proportionate to a progressive tax
system are enjoyed by lower income taxpayers, who are most likely
to apply tax savings to increased consumption. Therefore, Simons
concluded that progressive taxation leads to lower savings and
higher consumption rates than does proportionate taxation. He
flatly dismissed the Keynesian theory that modern society suffers
from oversaving, and endorsed the generally accepted economic at-
titude that increased saving is in most cases beneficial to economic
growth. 155
'12 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
H. SIMONS, supra note 45, at 19-20.
Simons was writing at a time (1938) when the top rate was 79% on income above
$5,000,000, which was then the highest top rate in United States history, other than the
1917 rate of 82% on income above $2,000,000. See Roberts & Samson, Historical Survey of
the Progressivity of the U.S. Income Tax, 12 THE AccT. HISTORIANS NOTEBOOK 11, 13
(Spring 1989). Simons wrote:
The attractiveness of jobs as jobs surely varies, on the whole, directly and
markedly with the remunerations which they carry. What competing firms must
pay to get dxperts away from one another is vastly different from what society
would be obliged to pay in order to keep the experts from being ditch-diggers.
Physical resources ... will always be more profitable to employ than to leave idle,
so long as progression falls short of 100 per cent or does not rise precipitously to
that level. Our captains of industry (enterprisers) are mainly engaged not in mak-
ing a living but in playing a great game; and it need make little difference whether
the evidence of having played well be diamonds and sables on one's wife or a
prominent place in the list of contributors under the income tax. Besides-and
this may be emphasized-the mere privilege of exercising power is no mean prize
for the successful enterpriser.
H. SIMoNs, supra note 45, at 20 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
" Here, Simons' comment sheds a thoughtful light on the history of industrialized
nations and the possible future of less developed countries. Simons wrote:
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Although he conceded that increased progression will cause re-
duced capital accumulation for future production, Simons paused
to consider whether that might be an acceptable trade-off.
There is, first of all, a question as to whether society should
make large sacrifices to further accumulation. To stress obliga-
tions to our children's children is often a means of diverting at-
tention from patent obligations to our contemporaries. For the fu-
ture there is a responsibility of maintaining a respectable
proportion between population and resources-which surely ad-
mits of more than one method. Of course progress should be en-
couraged; but its costs should give us pause, in a society mature
enough to exercise some deliberate control. Both progress and
justice are costly luxuries-costly, above all, in terms of each
other ...
There is also a difficult question, from the point of view of
the economics of welfare, as to the relative importance of produc-
tional and distributional considerations. There is real point, if not
truth, in the suggestion that, within wide limits, the quality of
human experience would be about the same at one income level
as at another if the relative position of persons and classes re-
mained unchanged. Poverty, want, and privation are in large
measure merely relative. Thus, something can be said for mitiga-
tion of inequality, even at the cost of reduction in the modal real
income." 8
C. Blum and Kalven: The Critical View
In 1953, Professors Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr.,
wrote a short book critiquing progressive taxation. They did not
quickly convert the nation to proportionate taxation, but perhaps
they demonstrated that Henry Simons was right in his contention
that progressivity is an issue more concerned with ethics than
rationality.
Blum and Kalven seemed to prefer Simons' approach. In 1963,
when the book was reprinted, they recorded some additional
thoughts on the view of progressivity as an ethical issue.
The cost of our present stock of productive instruments was, in a significant sense,
decades and centuries of terrible poverty for the masses. Conversely, the cost of
justice will be a slowing-up in our material advance (though this effect may be
modified if and as governments assume the role of savers).
H. SIMONS, supra note 45, at 22.
6 Id. at 24-25 (emphasis in original).
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Ten years ago we were puzzled as to why Henry Simons'
bluntness had not had more impact on the tone of discussions in
the United States. Writing in the late thirties, he exasperatedly
asserted that the whole superstructure of sacrifice and ability-to-
pay theorizing was simply nonsense and that the case for progres-
sion was no more and no less than the case for mitigating "un-
lovely" economic inequality.1 57
The authors claimed to have approached their topic with a bias
favoring progressivity. 158 Appropriately, Blum and Kalven's The
Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation begins with a careful defini-
tion of the central issue, particularly with reference to the differ-
ence between progression arising from a constant rate tax with a
personal exemption, 15 9 and the type of progression (relative to both
total and taxable incomes) obtained from actually graduating the
statutory marginal rates. The former is defined as degression.
Based upon their conclusion that "[i]t is almost unanimously
agreed that some exemption keyed to at least a minimum subsis-
tence standard of living is desirable,"16 0 the authors put aside the
issue of degression and focused their attention on the latter form
of progression.6 1
The authors discussed three general objections often lodged
against progressivity. First, they pointed to the additional compli-
cation progressivity adds to an income tax and its administration.
Income splitting and other problems, related to identifying the
proper taxpayer fit into this category. Progressivity also creates the
problem of identifying or defining the appropriate taxable unit in
family matters. With a flat tax, husbands, wives, and children can
be taxed together or separately with no difference in impact or tax
liability. The difference between married, single, and head-of-
household taxpayers would disappear (except with respect to the
appropriate size of the exemption). Splitting income among differ-
ent years is the temporal equivalent of splitting income among dif-
11 W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 110, at xiv.
15s Id. at 2-3. "Like most people today we found the notion of progression immediately
congenial. Upon early analysis the notion retained its attractiveness, but our curiosity as to
the source of its appeal increased." Id. at 2.
:" See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
60 W. BLUM & H. KALvEN, JR., supra note 110, at 4.
161 Id. "With these qualifications the question of the essay can be finally formulated:
On what grounds is a progressive tax on all incomes over a minimum subsistence exemption
to be preferred to a proportionate tax on all incomes over a minimum subsistence exemp-
tion?" Id.
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ferent individuals, and it is aggravated (though not created) by a
progressive rate structure. Under a flat tax, the seemingly ines-
capable year-end ritual of deciding whether to accelerate deduc-
tions into the expiring year and delay income into the coming year,
or vice versa, becomes purely a matter of the time value of money.
The question of the year in which the individual will be in a higher
tax bracket drops out of the equation.16 2
And one of the few plausible arguments, if not the only one, for
special treatment of capital gains stems from this characteristic of
progression. Because a capital gain may have been in the making
for many years, it seems unfair to tax all of it as the income of a
single year. 63
The authors also implied that the reduced importance of tim-
ing, which would result from elimination of progressive rates,
would allow repeal of the rules for the net operating loss carryback
and carryforward,:6 4 installment sale method,'6 5 last-in first-out
("LIFO") inventory method, 66 and carryover of capital losses.'
Such an implication is not sound, however, for several reasons: the
installment sale method is motivated in large part by a sympathy
for the taxpayer who has a realized gain that is much greater than
his cash from the transaction; the LIFO method is driven by desire
to reduce the effective tax rate on inflationary gain by delaying the
tax as long as possible; and net operating loss and capital loss car-
ryover provisions are primarily based on the government's reluc-
tance to give immediate refunds for such losses.
The second general objection to progressivity is that it is "po-
litically irresponsible.' ' 6 8 This is the "tyranny of the majority" ar-
gument, which questions the right of the majority to impose such a
burden on the higher-income minority. The response to this, which
the authors acknowledged, is that such an objection applies to
every decision made by a democratic government. The authors
made reference to constitutional limitations on the power of the
102 For many people, perhaps the majority of those who do this type of planning, the
great width of the brackets in the current three-tiered system has already eliminated this
issue. The de-emphasis of this issue from the 1986 move toward a flat tax affirms the co-
gency of the authors' argument.
W6' . BLUM & H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 110, at 16-17.
See I.R.C. § 172 (1990).
166 See id. §§ 453, 453A, 453B.
166 See id. §§ 472-474.
167 See id. § 1212.
166 W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 110, at 19.
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majority in certain areas, such as free speech, which merely high-
lights the fact that those who framed and adopted our Constitu-
tion never deemed the upper end of a highly paid person's income
to rank with the fundamental individual freedoms protected by the
Bill of Rights.16
The third general objection to progressivity is that it reduces
total national output. Blum and Kalven noted that a progressive
tax is not the only type that can reduce the productivity of our
economy:
It is worth a reminder that the disadvantages of progression, as
well as its advantages, in this connection and in all others, are to
be assessed only by contrasting a progressive system which raises
a given amount of revenue to a proportionate one which raises an
identical amount of revenue. 17°
Nevertheless, the comparable progressive tax will subject the most
highly paid (and therefore, arguably, most productive) citizens to a
higher marginal tax rate than would the revenue-equivalent pro-
portionate system.
One fundamental assumption that the authors made regarding
productivity deserved more thought than it received. They as-
serted that "[iut is not difficult to concede that money is the domi-
nant stimulus to work in our society."'' Others would disagree
with this assumption, however, especially with respect to high in-
come individuals. It ignored the large number of "workaholics" in
higher income strata. It also gave inadequate attention to the non-
monetary rewards that often flow from highly paid positions.
Simons, whom the authors quote only briefly on this point, saw
money as only one stimulus at work in our society. 17 2
'O Id. Their 1963 introduction paints a much more realistic picture of the history of
progressivity in the United States:
There has always been, both here and in other economically advanced societies, a
large degree of official fraud in sponsoring a popular impression as to the amount
of actual progressivity in the tax system. High surtax rates have invariably been
accompanied by big holes in the tax base, so that the effective rates for most tax-
payers are totally obscure and undoubtedly far below the published schedule of
rates .... The classic objection about the political irresponsibility of majority
vote seems almost to be turned upside down. Instead of the majority voting high
taxes on the minority, the minority seems to have beguiled the majority into
thinking that this has actually happened.
Id. at xx-xxi.
170 Id. at 21.
1 Id. at 22.
172 See H. SIMONS, supra note 45, at 20. "Our captains of industry (enterprisers) are
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It also can reasonably be argued that much of the interest of
the rich in money is in having relatively more than their peers.
This is a corollary to Simons' assertion that "[p]overty, want, and
privation are in large measure merely relative.' 173 Because a ra-
tional, progressive income tax will not upset the relative pre-tax
order (of rich, richer, richest), this kind of egotistical stimulus to
working will not be impaired by progressive taxation.
Another element in the productivity debate is the possible dis-
couragement of saving and investing. There is widespread agree-
ment that progressive taxation has a negative effect on capital ac-
cumulation and that such accumulation is an important element in
economic growth. As mentioned above, Simons wrote that "[w]ith
respect to capital accumulation, however, the consequences are
certain to be significantly adverse,"'1 4 but that, in his opinion, the
incremental loss of productivity is probably justified by the reduc-
tion of inequality. Blum and Kalven agreed with him on the first
conclusion but parted company with him on the second. They
identified two phases in the formation of "real capital": the deci-
sion of an individual with discretionary income to save, rather than
consume, a part of it; 7 and the decision by that same, or another,
person to invest those savings in a business or other venture. 76
The authors recognized that the effect of progressive taxation on
the decision to save is unclear. Some people save in response to the
rate of interest their savings can earn. For high income people who
save for this reason, the incentive to save is reduced by the higher
tax rates that accompany a progressive system (as opposed to a
proportionate system that generates equal revenue). On the other
hand, other people save to accumulate a specific amount of money
for retirement. For them, reduction in rate of return due to the tax
burden will actually force them to save more to achieve the same
retirement goal. The authors recognized that, since the magnitudes
of these two savings incentives are unknown, the net effect on sav-
ing of a particular tax rate is also unknown.
Blum and Kalven's analysis of the effects of progressivity on
mainly engaged not in making a living but in playing a great game." Id.
'3 Id. at 25.
Id. at 21.
76 See W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 110, at 23; see also McCombs, supra
note 25, at 673 (source-based and use-based investment schemes as investment incentives to
encourage decisions).
11 W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 110, at 23.
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investment (i.e., risk-taking) is not applicable under the current
United States tax system with its extremely wide rate brackets. If
one thinks back (or forward) to a rate structure containing a large
number of relatively narrow brackets, however, the discussion is
valuable. Under such a system, if an investment is successful, the
profit will push the investor into a higher tax bracket and such
profit will be taxed at a rate higher than the investor normally ex-
periences. If the investment is unsuccessful, the loss will pull the
investor down to a bracket lower than normal. As a result, the gov-
ernment takes a higher than normal percentage of investment
profits, while it absorbs through loss deductions a lower than nor-
mal percentage of investment losses (assuming full deductibility of
losses). Again, Blum and Kalven distinguished between high tax
rates in general and high tax rates generated by progressivity.
While a high tax rate itself may discourage investment, its impact
is enlarged by a progressive system. Ultimately, the "relatively
wealthy," a significant source of investment funds, are taxed under
progression at rates higher than the single rate prevalent under a
proportionate tax rate.1 7
Blum and Kalven identified the effect of progressivity on
levels of saving and investment as central to the debate over
progressivity, and referenced Simons' idea of government capital-
ism. Thus, it may be in order to consider the capital formation
issue more broadly, and in a modern context. Simons did not go
into much detail in his discussion of government capital formation,
but he did suggest that the government might appropriately
purchase all regulated utilities. This, he believed, could be accom-
plished without a major overthrow of our economic system.178 If
inadequate capital formation is a valid concern, however, perhaps
we should be searching for possible ways to implement Professor
Simons' concept of government capitalism, structured in ways and
within limits that impose acceptably small costs in terms of greater
government control over the private economy.
It is not at all clear that changing from progressive to propor-
tionate taxation will increase private capital formation sufficiently
to satisfy those who are concerned about it. Indeed, progressivity
of federal taxes was reduced by the several tax reform acts of the
177 Id. at 24.
"' In Nebraska, for example, nearly all electricity is produced at facilities owned and
operated by public power districts. Despite this, Nebraska has avoided a reputation as a
socialist state.
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1980s, yet Congress is still grappling for ways to increase the
United States saving rate. 17 9 One point remains clear-taxes are
not the only significant variable in capital formation. Cultural atti-
tudes toward consumption and saving are also important
ingredients. 180
Desire to retain progressive taxation, therefore, might not be
the only force leading to endorsement of government capitalism.
For example, in the United States, gradual changes in cultural atti-
tudes could, over a span of multiple generations, produce a situa-
tion in which people save a lower percentage of their incomes than
did their grandparents under otherwise identical circumstances.
Furthermore, despair over the chances of economic development in
the third world outstripping population growth could convince in-
dustrialized nations to assume the role of capitalists for less devel-
oped countries.
On the subject of a reduction in production caused by a pro-
gressive tax, the parallel between the Blum and Kalven team and
Henry Simons continues, despite their inapposite conclusions on
progression. The continuation of these diametric conclusions gives
some validity to Simons' claim that progressivity ultimately rests
upon an ethical judgment rather than logical reasoning.
In contrast, a number of theories have been advanced in sup-
port of a progressive income tax. One is the suggestion that a pro-
gressive tax is highly sensitive to contraction and expansion of the
overall economy, and that it reacts to each in an appropriate man-
ner. During a recession, for example, revenues produced by a pro-
gressive tax will fall faster than those from a proportionate tax,
leaving more money in the private economy at a time when it is
especially needed. During an expansion, revenues produced by a
progressive tax grow faster than the economy, and faster than rev-
enues from a proportionate tax, reducing the likelihood that the
economy will become "overheated" and inflationary. During reces-
sion and expansion, these effects occur more quickly than federal
spending changes could be made, and also reduce the amount of
spending and monetary adjustments necessary to stabilize the
economy.
179 See, e.g., Davenport, JEC [Joint Economic Committee] Considers Tax Changes To
Bolster Saving Rate, 43 TAX NoTEs 1572 (1989) (JEC convened to "examine the possibility
of manipulating the tax code to boost savings and investment").
18o In my opinion, cultural attitudes are the largest factor in the saving rate, dwarfing
the effects of tax structure and rate of return.
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The sacrifice theory is another supportive theory.181 According
to Blum and Kalven, "[i]t.ignores the benefits received from gov-
ernment and treats taxes as though they were a confiscation of
property. The problem then becomes one of confiscating in an eq-
uitable manner. s18 2
Although the term "equality of sacrifice" is often used in this
context, it is used generally to describe a condition under which
each person suffers a proportionate, rather than truly equal, sacri-
fice. If "sacrifice" is taken to mean the number of dollars surren-
dered, then proportionate sacrifice theory simply leads to propor-
tionate taxation. If, however, sacrifice is to be measured in terms of
potential satisfaction surrendered to the government, and if that
meaning is combined with the theory of declining marginal utility
of money, then proportionate sacrifice in terms of potential satis-
faction will require progressive surrender in terms of dollars. 83
Blum and Kalven separated the truly equal sacrifice idea from
that of proportionate sacrifice, although the distinction is difficult
to discern. They demonstrated that the truly equal sacrifice ap-
proach does not necessarily lead to progressive rates. Simons has
already stated that if the utility curve for money slopes downward
only gradually, a goal of equal sacrifice will produce regressive tax
rates.8 4 Blum and Kalven added that:
This is an important step since it is one thing to assume that the
utility of money declines but quite another to assume the rate at
which it declines. Clearly, the fewer the demands the argument
makes on knowledge of the slope of the curve, the stronger the
argument will be.185
Both of these sacrifice theories involve a two-step process.
181 See W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 110, at 32 n.100; see also H. SIDGWICK,
PRINCIPLES OF POLICAL ECONOMY 566 (2d ed. 1887) (equal sacrifice by all should be goal of
taxation).
182 W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 110, at 39.
183 See id. at 39-45 (arguing for proportionate sacrifice).
184 H. SIMONS, supra note 45, at 7.
185 W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 110, at 41. In my opinion, the equal sacrifice
approach must be abandoned, because, as stated by British economist A.C. Pigou, "[iun
order to prove that the principle of equal sacrifice necessarily involves progression we should
need to know that the last £10 of a £1000 income carry less satisfaction than the last £1 of a
£100 income; and this the law of diminishing utility does not assert." A.C. PIoou, A STUDY
IN PUBLIC FINANCE 86 (3d rev. ed. 1962). Personal reflection leads to the intuitive conclusion
that the utility curve for money does not decline that steeply. At least, many reasonable
people could so conclude, which takes the strength out of this theory's support for
progression.
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First, each must establish a normative proposition of how the sac-
rifice of paying taxes should be shared. Second, a tax rate structure
that achieves the proposed sharing must be shown. The equal sac-
rifice theory is strong on the first step and weak on the second.
The proposal that a sacrifice for the good of the group should be
borne equally by all its members is, superficially, very appealing.186
As discussed above, however, under this theory, support for pro-
gression depends upon the idea that the marginal utility of money
decreases faster than income increases, and this supposition is sub-
ject to serious challenge.
Conversely, the proportional sacrifice theory as an argument
for progression is strong on the second step, but at first glance
seems weak on the first. Assuming for a moment the normative
proposition that each person should suffer a proportionate sacrifice
to pay for government expenditures, progressive taxation with re-
spect to income is necessary and appropriate to achieve that goal.
Any normal, declining marginal utility curve for money will sup-
port the claim for progression.1 87 Under any normal, downward
sloping utility curve, even a gentle slope, a tax that takes twenty
percent of income from both high income and low income taxpay-
ers will be proportionate with respect to dollars but regressive with
respect to satisfaction sacrificed. Because the high income individ-
ual will pay the tax with less valuable (i.e., less satisfying) dollars,
that person will sacrifice a lower percentage of his satisfaction. It is
very clear that progressive tax rates are necessary to achieve pro-
portionate sacrifice.
The more difficult part of the analysis is to make a compelling
argument for the first step, i.e., the proposition that taxpayers
1'" But see A.C. PIGou, supra note 185, at 43-44 (poor people ultimately lose in equal
sacrifice situation).
8' Blum and Kalven were rather impressed by the discovery by Dutch economist Co-
hen-Stuart in the late 19th century of certain utility curves that decline but do not lead to
progression under the proportional sacrifice theory. British economist F.Y. Edgeworth also
wrote about such curves. While Blum and Kalven stated in their text that "any argument
for progression based on [proportionate sacrifice] loses some of its force because of the fact
that a declining curve does not always result in progression," they admitted in a footnote
that:
Cohen-Stuart and Edgeworth confine themselves to showing only that it is possi-
ble to find an instance of a declining utility curve which would not result in pro-
gression under the [proportionate] sacrifice formula. Neither suggests that such a
curve is at all plausible. It takes considerable ingenuity to find such an instance,
and the curve is eccentric.
W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 110, at 43 n.109.
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should suffer a proportionate, rather than equal, sacrifice of the
potential satisfactions represented by their incomes. Surprisingly,
Blum and Kalven presented a convincing argument that propor-
tionate sacrifice is the superior choice.
Any theory of equalizing the sacrifice of taxpayers implicitly as-
sumes that the taxes are a necessary evil falling upon a distribu-
tion of money, and therefore upon a distribution of satisfactions,
which [distributional pattern] is otherwise acceptable. With this
assumption the problem is not to use the tax system to adjust
existing inequalities in that distribution but simply to leave all
taxpayers equally "worse off" after taxes. The vice of the equal
sacrifice formula is that it is regressive when measured by satis-
factions and this becomes compellingly clear if large enough sacri-
fices are exacted equally from each taxpayer. The corresponding
virtue of the proportionate sacrifice formula is that it remains
neutral as to the relative distribution of satisfactions among tax-
payers. Under it they are all equally "worse off" [in terms of sat-
isfaction, not dollars] after taxes.1 88
In The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, one can discern
strength in each of the two steps that are required to support pro-
gressive taxation with the proportionate sacrifice theory. Although
Blum and Kalven were not fully convinced by their own argu-
ments, upon close analysis their arguments on behalf of the pro-
portionate sacrifice theory are compelling. They summarize them
as follows:
[The proportionate sacrifice theory] makes relatively few de-
mands on knowledge about the utility curve for money, other
than that it declines; and it narrows considerably the issue be-
tween progressive and proportionate taxation. As between one
who favors proportional taxation on grounds of its neutrality and
one who favors the proportionate sacrifice standard on grounds of
its neutrality there is only the issue of whether there is a mean-
ingful and sufficiently ascertainable money utility curve for all
taxpayers.189
The only remaining difficulty is how to devise a specific rate
schedule that implements the proportionate sacrifice theory. To re-
main true to the reasoning behind the theory, some estimated util-
ity curve for money must be constructed. It seems likely that there
Id. at 43-44 (footnotes omitted).
,8 Id. at 44-45.
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have been many years in which United States statutory rates have
been much more progressive than could be justified under this the-
ory, with any reasonably estimated money utility curve.190
290 With the caveat that upper statutory rates are usually much higher than effective
rates on true net income (due to the porous statutory definition of taxable income), the
following chart lists the highest and lowest rates for each year in the history of the federal
income tax.
TABLE I THE GREAT EXPERIMENT: PROGRESSIVITY FROM A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
Number Income Exempt Top-Bottom Rate
of Tax Top Level for Income Lowest Comparison: High-Low
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of the utility curve for money justifies rates above fifty percent, 9'
it is still possible to reject such high rates under this theory by
following Carver's lead. He began with the minimum sacrifice the-
ory, which endorses the most extreme form of progressivity, and
then superimposed a rate-limiting theory that considered the bur-
den on others from the overall productivity loss caused by the ex-
tremely high rates.'92 His second step could be added to the pro-
portionate sacrifice theory in the same manner. In this way, with
some estimates of productivity losses caused by various rates, one
could construct a declining marginal utility curve for money that
maps the "boundary," below which one is not willing to follow the
proportionate sacrifice theory. If the utility curve for money de-
clines so steeply that the proportionate sacrifice theory prescribes
unacceptably high rates at some income levels, Carver's theory of
productivity losses can be used to constrain the rates ultimately
selected to more reasonable levels.
One objection to progressivity raised by Blum and Kalven was
that even if these various theories have some validity as general
arguments in favor of progression, none gives any hint of what the
theoretically justifiable rate structure should be.19 3 Properly con-
ceived, their objection should not be used as a general argument
against progressive taxes, but is valid only against highly progres-
sive taxes. If it is agreed that the proportionate sacrifice' theory
demonstrates only that the ideal rate structure is progressive and
nothing about the proper degree of progressivity, then it is highly
likely that a moderately progressive set of rates will be closer than
a strictly proportionate tax to the unknown theoretical ideal. As
the proposed rate structure becomes more progressive, this likeli-
hood is reduced. Seligman made an argument of this nature, with-
out identifying the fact that the likelihood of being near the ideal
varies when the proposed progressivity is changed. 9 4 As long as
Roberts & Samson, supra note 154. It should also be noted that even the top statutory rate
can sometimes be subject to interpretation. For example, this author would list the top rate
in 1988 as 33%. See I.R.C. § 1(g) (1990).
19' This assumes, for purposes of discussion, that rates above 50% are objectionable on
other, perhaps nonobjective grounds.
192 See E.R.A SELIGMAN, supra note 109, at 40-122 (varied treatment of progressive tax-
ation in foreign countries).
192 See W. BLUM & H. KALveN, JR., supra note 110, at 53.
194 See E.R.A. SELIGMAN, supra note 109, at 293-94 (footnote omitted). Seligman wrote:
It may, indeed, frankly be conceded that the theory of faculty cannot determine
any definite rate of progression as the ideally just rate. To this extent there seems
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the argument is restricted to the defense of moderately progressive
rates, it provides the better response to this issue. With this in
mind, Blum and Kalven seem almost disingenuous in their com-
plaint that the perfect proportionate sacrifice rate package cannot
be determined.
CONCLUSION
Every individual who hopes to be a scholar or preeminent
practitioner in her field must understand the history of that field.
For those whose professional interests lie in tax policy, the preced-
ing authors and works stand together as a "primer" of foundation-
building thoughts on fundamental issues. In some cases an author's
position lent itself naturally to comparison and contrast with an-
other author, while at other times an author stood distinctively by
himself. Similarly, certain portions of the reviewed works
prompted a natural response in terms of modern circumstances
and debates, while other portions must be absorbed as general his-
torical knowledge and are not directly tied to a specific current
topic. Perhaps the overarching lesson is that pragmatism and ethi-
cal judgment are necessary companions to theoretical analysis in
this field, and the greatest difficulty is in knowing which to apply
at each point in one's analysis of these or other tax policy issues.
to be some truth in Mill's contention that progressive taxation cannot give that
"degree of certainty" on which a legislator should act; as well as in McCulloch's
assertion that when we abandon proportion we "are at sea without rudder or com-
pass." It is true that proportion is in one sense certain, and that progression is
uncertain. The argument, however, proves too much. An uncertain rate, if it be in
the general direction of justice, may nevertheless be preferable to a rate which,
like that of proportion, may b4 more certain without being so equitable .... In
truth, a strict proportional tax, if we accept the point of view mentioned above, is
really more arbitrary as over against the individual taxpayers, than a moderately
progressive tax. The ostensible "certainty" hence involves a really greater
arbitrariness.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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